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Antidiscrimination laws enforce the idea that no one should be forced or
encouraged to hide their race, gender, sexuality, or other characteristics of their
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identity. So why is disability rights law the glaring exception? Other areas of
antidiscrimination law have eschewed forms of enforced privacy about protected
classes and, as a result, challenge privacy norms as problematic, anti-agentic, and,
at times, counter to structural reform goals. In contrast, disability rights law values
privacy norms to preempt discrimination; in other words, if you never reveal the
information, no one can discriminate against you because of that information. This
Article argues that this is a mistake, and that to truly discard stigma and false notions
of disability as synonymous with incapacity, we need to fundamentally challenge and
reconceive of how privacy applies to disability identity, legal status, the law’s remedial
role and, in some settings, redesign legal interventions to incentivize publicity values.
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INTRODUCTION
Disability law has a complicated relationship with privacy.1 A central
normative assumption is that, whenever possible, information related to
disability should be kept conﬁdential to avoid discrimination.2
Antidiscrimination law and society have expressed a preference for privacy in
the disability context. As a result, laws in this area often reinforce disability
as a private, undesirable fact, and regulate its disclosure. In contrast, the
relationship between privacy and publicity is more nuanced in other areas of
antidiscrimination law. For example, the law is neutral on the position of
whether an individual capable of concealing their Blackness ought to favor
disclosure or nondisclosure.3 Partly a function of an accepted (albeit
problematic) view that people can “see” race, many Black people lack the
1 “Privacy” here includes primarily informational and bodily, intellectual, spatial, decisional,
communicational, associational, proprietary, and behavioral privacy. Bert-Jaap Koops, Bryce Clayton
Newell, Tjerk Timan, Ivan Škorvánek, Tomislav Chokrevski & Maša Galič, A Typology of Privacy, 38
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 483, 566-69 (2017). Privacy, as I argue in this Article, has individual and collective
properties. See infra Part I. Scholars continue to debate existing and normative boundaries of
“privacy.” See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 490–91 (2006)
(organizing privacy into four main categories and subcategories: (1) information collection
(including surveillance); (2) information processing (including identiﬁcation, insecurity); (3)
information dissemination (breach of conﬁdentiality, disclosure, appropriation, distortion); and (4)
invasion (intrusion, overreaching, decisional interference)). This Article recognizes the theoretical
and utilitarian complexities of this debate, but advancement of a normative position on the
epistemological nature of privacy is beyond the scope of this paper. I assume privacy (and the rights
and responsibilities that attach) is context-dependent and varies accordingly.
2 People with more visible disabilities often do not have the luxury of wrestling with the
question of disclosure because they visibly exhibit markers of disability, what I call the “aesthetics
of disability” in a prior theoretical account. See generally Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability,
119 COLUM. L. REV. 895 (2019). “Discrimination” here refers to diﬀerential treatment based on
protected identity characteristics and not positive or neutral instances of socially/legally acceptable
diﬀerential treatment such as diﬀerential treatment based on age that limits access to voting or,
more mundanely, alcohol consumption.
3 Society’s preferences for “whiteness” and related performances of “whiteness” do nudge those
capable of passing or covering race to do so. The point here is that disability law takes a notable
normative position on disclosure.
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choice of whether or not to claim Blackness.4 As a result, Black people might
make diﬀerent choices along a privacy–publicity continuum depending on
the extent to which they manifest visible markers of diﬀerence.
Disability identity, however, finds itself clustered at the extreme privacy
end of the same continuum. Disability laws nudge those capable of doing so
toward passing or covering their less visible disabilities. While there are
certainly benefits to disability law’s preference for privacy—most notably,
avoiding discrimination based on antiquated biases about disability—this
strong privacy norm also has costs which we have not fully considered. For
example, disability is also a sociopolitical identity with increasing salience in
contemporary political discourse and a growing voting bloc courted by
political actors.5
This Article challenges this principal normative assumption in disability
law that privacy best serves both individual and structural antidiscrimination
goals.6 I argue that a preference for privacy-enforcing norms in disability law
4 Of course, skin color and other aesthetic markers associated with “Blackness” also exist along
a continuum relative to perceived “whiteness.” Like people with less apparent disabilities, those with
lighter skin color may be faced with opportunities for claiming “Blackness.” As Professor Lori
Tharps has argued:

In the 21st century, as America becomes less white and the multiracial community—
formed by interracial unions and immigration—continues to expand, color will be
even more signiﬁcant than race in both public and private interactions. Why? Because
a person’s skin color is an irrefutable visual fact that is impossible to hide, whereas race
is a constructed, quasi-scientiﬁc classiﬁcation that is often only visible on a
government form.
Lori L. Tharps, The Diﬀerence Between Racism and Colorism, TIME (Oct. 6, 2016, 3:49 PM),
https://time.com/4512430/colorism-in-america [https://perma.cc/BA4Q-XVVA].
5 See, e.g., The Biden Plan for Full Participation and Equality for People with Disabilities, BIDEN HARRIS,
https://joebiden.com/disabilities [https://perma.cc/KV42-7XAW] (discussing President Biden’s goals of
“equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” for individuals
with disabilities); Michelle Diament, Biden Pandemic Strategy Puts Focus On People With Disabilities, DISABILITY
SCOOP (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2021/01/25/biden-pandemic-strategy-puts-focus-onpeople-with-disabilities/29163 [https://perma.cc/Y4LA-UCA6] (outlining President Biden’s attempts to
support the disabled community particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic); Exec. Order No. 13,995,
86 Fed. Reg. 7193 (Jan. 26, 2021); Maggie Astor, Elizabeth Warren Opens a New Front in Disability Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-disability-plan.html
[https://perma.cc/K4XJ-5LNC] (discussing then-presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren’s plans to assist
individuals with disabilities, including free education and elimination of sub-minimum wage pay); LISA
SCHUR & DOUGLAS KRUSE, FACT SHEET: DISABILITY AND VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2018 ELECTIONS
1-2 (2019), https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/Program_Disability_Research/
Fact%20Sheet%20Disability%20Voter%202018%20Elections.pdf [https://perma.cc/A25K-SFBH] (reporting
that “[v]oter turnout surged” in the November 2018 election cycle among people with disabilities and
comparing 14.3 million people with disabilities voting with an estimated 15.2 million Black people and 11.7
million Latinx people voting in the cycle).
6 I made a narrower claim in an earlier piece. See generally Jasmine E. Harris, Processing
Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457 (2015) (arguing that a history of closed adjudicative proceedings
created a public deﬁcit of information about disabilities that would help challenge antiquated stigma
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has generated Pyrrhic victories with underappreciated negative costs that stunt,
rather than advance, the broader antidiscrimination mission of the law itself.7
Research on disability stigma and prejudice suggests that disability stigma
is quite sticky, and while the built world has indeed changed, attitudinal shifts
remain stagnant. For example, a recent longitudinal study of implicit and
explicit discriminatory attitudes about sexuality, race, gender, skin tone, age,
disability, and body weight revealed that, while explicit attitudes about all
categories moved from negative to neutral and implicit attitudes about
sexuality, race, gender, and skin tone shifted from negative to neutral or
positive, implicit attitudes about disability and age remained static over the
ten-year period studied.8 Researchers attributed the rapid attitudinal changes
in the context of sexuality and race to the publicity and public debate (called
“societal priority”) around these two areas of discrimination: “In the United
States today, race and sexuality attitudes appear to be societally prioritized
(e.g., through the Black Lives Matter movement or legislation about samesex marriage) and therefore are more frequently discussed than other
attitudes, such as age or disability.”9
The Center for Disease Control estimates that there are sixty-one million
people with disabilities in the United States (one in four adults), the majority
of whom are not readily identiﬁable as disabled individuals.10 Privacy masks
of incapacity associated with disability). Other disability and health law scholars have heavily
invested in the opposite position—that we ought to invest more in a privacy approach to prevent
disability discrimination. See generally, e.g., Jessica L. Roberts, Protecting Privacy to Prevent
Discrimination, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2097 (2015).
7 Harris, supra note 2, at 916-31 (discussing the “logic of disability rights law” and its
antidiscrimination mission (stylization omitted)). Scholars recognize the limitations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the persistence of disability discrimination. See, e.g.,
Mark C. Weber, The Common Law of Disability Discrimination, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 429, 431 n.11;
Arlene S. Kanter, The Americans with Disabilities Act at 25 Years: Lessons to Learn from the Convention
on the Rights of People with Disabilities, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 819, 822 (2015); see also SAMUEL R.
BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 116-28
(2009) (noting underenforcement of the ADA as to public accommodations and employment and
the limits of the ADA in promoting meaningful integration); Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E.
Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 885-93 (2006)
(discussing remedial weakness such as the ability of the ADA to respond to serial employeroﬀenders); Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1854 (2005) (discussing some commentators’ belief that Title II of the ADA
“guarantees a secret and independent vote to people with disabilities” and that election
administrators “are in utter noncompliance” with such a standard).
8 Tessa E. S. Charlesworth & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Patterns of Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: I.
Long-Term Change and Stability From 2007 to 2016, 30 PSYCH. SCI. 174, 174 (2019).
9 Id. at 181; see also id. (“Societal priority corresponds to more frequent and repeated exposure
to debate or counterarguments that may, in turn, induce greater attitude change.”).
10 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DISABILITY IMPACTS ALL OF US (2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/disabilityandhealth/documents/disabilities_impacts_all_of_us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6DH4-845L]. The number of people with less visible disabilities is difficult to assess
with certainty for a number of reasons including reliance on self-selection and identification (which is
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the prevalence, diﬀerentiation, and pervasiveness of disability in society. This
allows nondisabled11 people to continue to narrowly associate disability with
socially constructed aesthetic markers, such as wheelchairs, missing limbs,
prosthetics, non-normative speech and behavior.12 For these individuals—
collectively, those with less visible disabilities—law and society aggressively
nudge them to closet, pass, or cover disability identity to meet able-bodied and
neurotypical expectations at great costs to physical and mental health,13
relationships,14 employment opportunities, and ﬁnancial success.15
Consequently, without a robust continuum of disability to draw on, the
diﬀerences between people with and without disabilities are exaggerated and
perceived to be immutable, tragic, and pitiful. This allows nondisabled people
to claim visible and measurable distinctions that can delineate the deserving,

the subject of this Article), definitions of what counts as physical or visible or less apparent, etc. See
infra Part IV. For the purpose of this Article, I will refer to individuals who manifest the aesthetics of
disability (sensory and behavioral markers) interchangeably with physical or visible disability and those
who do not manifest the aesthetic markers as people with less apparent disabilities.
11 I use “nondisabled” and “people with disabilities” to make the point and ultimately
demonstrate the fallacy of such rigid distinctions.
12 See Harris, supra note 2, at 931 (coining the phrase “aesthetics of disability” to describe the
aesthetic markers of disability that trigger aﬀective responses in nondisabled people).
13 Caroline Reilly writes:
Resisting care . . . allows us to invoke normalcy and to pretend: We ﬁght through the
pain, mostly to prove to ourselves that we’re just like everyone else. And while that
can feel like a triumph, we’re really just hurting ourselves. Pain is traumatic, and it
stays with us—burrowing into our brain, our nervous system, and our skin. It’s for all
these reasons that disclosure can be such a catharsis . . . .
Caroline Reilly, The Intimate Act of Performing Pain, BITCH MEDIA (Feb. 12, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.bitchmedia.org/article/privacy-and-disclosure-with-chronic-illnesses
[https://perma.cc/H9U3-7CK9].
14 Describing her experiences dating with an invisible disability, Amy Gaeta frames the
problem as ableism—not disability:
[W]hat failed me the most was assumptions about disabled people and dating. First . . .
assumptions that disability causes a tragic life, that dating us is a burden because we are
“needy.” Dating us makes non-disabled people saints taking on a charity case. Second
. . . the false notion that disability and sexiness are at odds. We might be “cute” in a
pitiful sort of way, but never desirable. Lastly . . . the stereotype that disabled people
have limited futures, so dating us is signing up for limited options and compromise.
Amy Gaeta, Navigating Dating, Disability, and Disclosure, ROOTED IN RTS. (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://rootedinrights.org/navigating-dating-disability-and-disclosure [https://perma.cc/7T9N-NCWN].
15 ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
102-04 (1963). See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (discussing this
phenomenon for LGBTQ+ individuals).
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legitimate minority of people with disabilities from those perceived to be
malingering charlatans.16
Why should disability law be premised on catering to social norms? The
answer is twofold. First, Congress identified the greatest barrier to inclusion
for people with disabilities as antiquated attitudes and biases that associate
disability with individual deficit, incapacity, and dependency.17 Second, the
remedial impact of antidiscrimination law in this area cannot be realized unless
we address these deeply rooted biases that are taken for granted as “normal”
or “justified.”18 Legal actors argue, frame, and interpret existing
antidiscrimination laws according to their common knowledge and experience.
However, as this Article contends, privacy has prevented the development of
meaningful public discourse to develop an accurate common base of
knowledge about disability needed to advance antidiscrimination efforts.
So how do we do attend to the information deficits in society about
disability that undermine antidiscrimination efforts? In my last Article, The
Aesthetics of Disability, I said we need to move beyond known or visible markers
of disability which effectively define the scope of legitimate claims to disability
rights.19 Here, I take up the other end of the aesthetic spectrum, the
overwhelming majority of people with disabilities in the United States who
do not exhibit commonly accepted physical or behavioral markers associated
with disability. I explore why publicity is central to the normative work that
needs to be done, and how the design of disability laws can incentivize
publicity while carefully balancing legitimate privacy interests. Dismissing
publicity as contrary to individual self-determination, as lawmakers, courts,
and society continue to do, ignores the structural constraints on choices
available to people with less apparent disabilities as well as the negative
individual and collective costs of “passing” or “covering.”20
I join several current scholarly debates with transferrable insights for
other areas of law and society. First, and principally, I challenge wellestablished assumptions about privacy and disability that permeate disability
16 See, e.g., N. Ann Davis, Invisible Disability, 116 ETHICS 153, 210 (2005) (“The presumption
that there are deep and obvious diﬀerences between being ‘normal’ and being disabled is one that is
deeply and dogmatically held: it is taken to be self-evident.”).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and . . . such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem . . . .”).
18 Challenging the perceived neutrality of the status quo is central to the work of critical race
theorists as well. See, e.g., Introduction to CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii, xiv (Kimberlé Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller & Kendall
Thomas eds., 1995) (“The construction of ‘racism’ from . . . the ‘perpetrator perspective’ restrictively
conceived racism as an intentional, albeit irrational, deviation by a conscious wrongdoer from
otherwise neutral, rational, and just ways of distributing jobs, power, prestige, and wealth.”).
19 Harris, supra note 2, at 967.
20 Cf. Yoshino, supra note 15, at 813 (“[P]assing, too, exacts its costs.”).
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laws. Last year marked the thirtieth anniversary of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), the central civil rights legislation for people with
disabilities. Consistent with this milestone, I join disability law scholars in
reﬂecting on the eﬃcacy of the ADA and its remedies. While the ADA visibly
transformed the architectural landscape for improved physical accessibility,21
it has experienced signiﬁcantly less success in shifting social norms of
disability, such as the association of disability with deﬁcit.22 I part ways with
scholars in this area by questioning the overreliance on privacy norms to do
the antidiscrimination work without greater nuance. Second, and relatedly,
this Article situates disability within the broader privacy literature by
recognizing the collective interests at stake in this debate. I draw upon the
privacy literature to argue for a more robust (and nuanced) analysis of privacy
interests in the disability context. Third, this Article begins to explore the
remedial value of publicity in disability law. In doing so, I join a broader
discussion taking place in the civil rights and social movements literature
where publicity continues to oﬀer new possibilities for grassroots organizing,
stigma reduction, and legislative reforms. I consider the #MeToo movement
and the Dreamers as examples.
This Article unfolds in ﬁve parts. Part I argues that the law treats
disability as private. Privacy was originally forced upon people with
disabilities in an eﬀort to segregate and render them invisible through legal
regulation much like the experience of other marginalized communities in the
United States.23 Along the way, however, social progressives and some legal
scholars have come to embrace the antidiscrimination properties of privacy
as a more powerful prescription to address contemporary forms of
discrimination—such as implicit biases, data mining, and surveillance—that
are diﬃcult to address through our existing antidiscrimination frameworks.
Part II then explains the logic of privacy norms in the disability context
and places this discussion within broader debates among privacy and
antidiscrimination scholars.
Part III argues that disability law has an overall preference for privacy and
explains why this preference makes sense. Sometimes, disability law requires
disclosure of disability, such as when a disabled individual wants to secure a

21 See Harris, supra note 2 at 896 (noting the ADA’s focus on “access to employment, public
services, and places of public accommodations”).
22 See, e.g., Charlesworth & Banaji, supra note 8, at 174 (describing longitudinal, comparative
analysis of patterns of long-term change in social-group attitudes (sexual orientation, race, skin tone,
age, disability, and body weight) and ﬁnding that all explicit responses changed toward attitude
neutrality but while implicit responses also changed toward neutrality for sexual orientation, race,
and skin-tone attitudes, there was stability over time for age and disability attitudes).
23 See infra Part V. (discussing the value of publicity).
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reasonable accommodation.24 Most other times, however, disability and
related areas of law nudge privacy by establishing rights to conﬁdential
treatment of information about disability or regulating the eﬀects of
disclosure of that information. This proclivity for privacy stems from its
relative eﬀectiveness in preventing discrimination. Said diﬀerently, disability
and related laws nudge individuals and institutions to protect information
about disability identity either by creating incentives for individual
nondisclosure or, when law requires its disclosure, ensuring that the disclosed
information remains under lock and key. In this way, law incentivizes
institutional actors to protect this information or face potential legal liability.
Part IV argues that the law’s preference for privacy is not costless. First,
privacy nudges obscure the pervasiveness and diversity of disability in society,
reducing public perceptions of disability to a narrow set of aesthetic markers.
Second, privacy nudges create “ambiguity aversion”25 that can force
discrimination underground and make people with less visible disabilities
more susceptible to implicit biases. Third, and relatedly, these nudges
privatize the costs of accommodations and mask the need (and opportunity)
for broader structural reforms.
Finally, Part V contends that publicity26 has underexplored beneﬁts and
argues that we should recalibrate disability law and policy to reﬂect these
values. Part V concludes with a discussion of three concrete ways to
incorporate publicity values in disability law and policy: data, institutional
incentives, and law reforms.
Taking disability public requires a nuanced approach that surfaces the
values and risks associated with legal designs that privilege privacy.
Importantly, this approach does not signal the demise of existing privacy
rights and individual agency. Legal scholars justify the current privacy nudges
underwriting disability law in service of decisional autonomy, particularly for
people with less apparent disabilities. Closer examination of the quality of
available choices shows that meaningful protection from discrimination is
often predicated on concealment of disability identity. A person without the
aesthetics of disability can choose, for example, to self-accommodate

24 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (“[T]he term ‘discriminate against a qualiﬁed individual on
the basis of disability’ includes . . . not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or
mental limitations . . . .” (emphasis added)).
25 See infra Section IV.B.
26 ”Publicity” means institutional and individual public association with disability which
includes, but is not limited to, personal disclosure. This concept is more than “visibility” as it
requires an aﬃrmative engagement with others and the process of adopting and disclosing. This
Article argues that publicity should become a guiding normative principle shaping disability
antidiscrimination laws. See infra Part V.
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(assuming certain risks27) and avoid the costs of disclosure including stigma
and discrimination.28 Alternatively, that person can disclose disability
identity in the workplace, for example, to obtain a reasonable
accommodation. The disabled individual, then, must rely on existing
antidiscrimination frameworks to prevent and, where possible, remedy legally
recognized harms if they arise.29 Said diﬀerently, risk aversion warrants
hiding to avoid disability stigma and discrimination (but it is the individual’s
choice). If, the person needs an accommodation or wants to disclose disability
to someone, again, it is the individual’s choice, but if there is a problem, the
individual must rely on a legal structure designed to remedy forms of explicit
discrimination that is ill-equipped to address contemporary manifestations of
implicit biases. This Article challenges this narrow vision of agency. I argue
that by reframing the stakes, we can have a more robust (and accurate) debate
regarding the value of publicity not only to the individual but also to people
with disabilities and society more broadly.
I. DISABILITY AS PRIVATE
Part I traces the construction of disability as a private fact. There are good
reasons for advancing privacy norms in the context of disability. Disclosure
of a concealable stigmatized social identity is risky. People who disclose can
be exposed to discrimination, bias, negative stereotypes or, in some cases,
violence.30 The treatment of disability identity as private reﬂects a
complicated history of deliberate state action to segregate, hide, rehabilitate,
or eliminate disability.31
27 Such risks include actual costs of self-accommodation. A person with a learning disability
who may need extra time to process the written information may, for example, work longer hours
but not report them to the employer. Over time, this may not only increase the emotional and
physical stress on the individual but may place the person at a disadvantage ﬁnancially since they
have worked signiﬁcant overtime without securing the ﬁnancial beneﬁt. This individual may be
reluctant to seek out additional social or work-related opportunities because they simply do not have
the time to do so.
28 The extreme approach advanced by some disability law scholars is to avoid disclosure
altogether as the only eﬀective way to control the disclosure and secondary disclosure of information
about disability. See, e.g., infra Part II.
29 There may be additional permutations here. I am not suggesting a clean binary, rather one
framing that descriptively accounts for the qualitatively poor choices under the current structure.
30 See, e.g., Debra McKinney, The Invisible Hate Crime, INTEL. REP., Summer 2018,
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2018/invisible-hate-crime
[https://perma.cc/KT2K-MLQT] (discussing the history, incidence, and nature of hate crimes against
disabled persons).
31 There are places where disability rights law requires disclosure, namely, for purposes of
requesting a reasonable accommodation and exercising rights under the ADA. The point is that
there are many areas where privacy is the default and people are encouraged, if they can, to pass as
nondisabled. See infra Part III.

2021]

Taking Disability Public

1691

A. Defining Privacy
Privacy is elusive.32 Part of the diﬃculty in deﬁning privacy comes from
its strategic deployment in public discourse as everything from an individual
right to a dignity interest or to a well-established norm related to personal
agency.33 Privacy includes the substance of the data which, in turn, may signal
diﬀerent public and private interests in that information and, ultimately, who
controls the data and regulates it (individual, public, or private actors).34 In
any formulation, privacy means more than personal data and more than
individual interests in dignity and autonomy; privacy is about power, a set of
rules used to regulate information that can control our lives.35 Descriptive
accounts of privacy—delineating what is, in fact, protected as private—diﬀer
in the legal scholarship from normative accounts of privacy: defending its
value and the extent to which it should be protected. In these discussions,
some treat privacy as an interest with moral value, while others refer to
privacy as a legal right that ought to be protected by society or the law.36 Still
32 Arthur Miller described privacy as “diﬃcult to deﬁne” precisely because “it is exasperatingly
vague and evanescent.” ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA
BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 25 (1971); see also NEIL RICHARDS, WHY PRIVACY MATTERS
(forthcoming) (manuscript at ch. 1, 3) (on ﬁle with author) (“[N]o one—not the general public, not
policymakers, nor even scholars—can quite agree on what precisely we mean by ‘privacy.’”).
33 See, e.g., Sjaak van der Geest, Lying in Defence of Privacy: Anthropological and Methodological
Observations, 21 INT’L J. SOC. RSCH. METHODOLOGY 541, 541 (2018) (“[T]he concept of privacy
deﬁes a precise deﬁnition because it refers to experiences that are too close to look at objectively.”).
This Article draws upon existing research and legal scholarship to deﬁne “privacy.” While I oﬀer a
normative view of privacy in the disability context, I do not weigh in on the more abstract discussion
of the bounds and nature of privacy in U.S. law.
34 See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap: A Review, 126 YALE L.J. 1180,
1182-83 (2017) (reviewing FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NIESSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S
GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND PROTEST (2015)) (arguing that conversations about the “digital divide” fail
to capture that it is not just about access to the technology, but the power dynamics among those who
create, monitor, and regulate the digital technology and the personal data that fuels them). References
to privacy in the disability context can also mean that families rather than the state have to deal with
it. Or, as I note in the text, it can also mean that a person’s disability status is private in that they do
not have to disclose it to others. Finally, privacy could mean that certain people should not enter the
public sphere, a frame originally used against women, Black, LGBTQ+, and Latinx communities.
35 RICHARDS, supra note 32 (manuscript intro. at 4); see, e.g., Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities art. 22, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3 (deﬁning privacy as freedom from
state interference in private aﬀairs and setting out the obligation of states to “protect the privacy of
personal, health and rehabilitation information . . . on an equal basis with others”); id. art. 31(1)(a)
(“The process of collecting and maintaining . . . information shall . . . [c]omply with legally
established safeguards, including legislation on data protection, to ensure conﬁdentiality and respect
for the privacy of persons with disabilities . . . .”).
36 See, e.g., ANITA L. ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? 23 (2011)
(“[T]he actual, reliable experience of privacy is a moral imperative and can be a requirement of social
justice.”). Critics of privacy, such as Richard Posner, claim that privacy interests are not distinctive
because the personal interests they protect are economically ineﬃcient. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER,
THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 233-37 (1981); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
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others, reframe the analysis away from protections the individual wants or
those forms of privacy accepted by most as appropriate for protection
(“popular privacy”) and those forms of privacy that are unwanted or
unprotected (“unpopular privacy”) but which, nevertheless, may warrant the
state denying the individual control over the disclosure decision because it
concerns matters fundamental to our sense of self, agency, or dignity.37
Privacy scholars generally believe in privacy’s instrumental (rather than
intrinsic) value; that is, privacy ought to serve broader values and interests of
society such as identity formation or democratic participation.38 Similarly,
our varied conceptions of privacy, however distinct, have certain consistent
elements, namely, that individual dignity and autonomy interests drive
discussions; responsibility is largely placed on the individual to police misuse;
and the nature of the data, if involuntarily disclosed, is perceived to cause
reputational harm and related costs.39 First, conceptions of privacy elevate
individual interests: “In the United States, information privacy has
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 99-100 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s construction of “privacy” lacks a well-deﬁned jurisprudential basis); CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 187-88 (1989) (advancing a feminist
critique of privacy, namely, that special treatment of privacy can be harmful when used as a shield
for violence against women).
37 ALLEN, supra note 36, at 6, 10-13. Anita Allen’s robust, inﬂuential body of work has
demonstrated the existence of beneﬁcial forms of privacy and the importance of private choice for
some historically marginalized communities such as women, people of color, and LGBTQ
communities. See, e.g., id.; Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiﬀs, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 1711, 1721-22 (2010) [hereinafter Allen, Privacy Torts] (examining the eﬃcacy of the
privacy tort in the context of LGBT rights); Anita L. Allen, Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52
STAN L. REV. 1175 (2000); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 187475 (2019) (arguing that “sexual privacy sits at the apex of privacy values because of its importance to
sexual agency, intimacy, and equality,” particularly for women).
38 RICHARDS, supra note 32 (manuscript intro. at 8) (exploring the value of privacy to
advancing “identity, freedom, and protection”). Richards’s conception of “intellectual privacy”
focuses on identity formation across multiple domains such as religious and political. See id.
(manuscript intro. at 8-9) (noting that the notion of privacy as freedom to explore and deﬁne oneself
is quite diﬀerent from the views of privacy skeptics such as Richard Posner who believe that privacy
allows people to be dishonest about their true selves).
39 See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31-32 (1967). Professor Westin described
four types of aspects of privacy with four related functions. The types or aspects of privacy include:
solitude (being alone), intimacy (being alone with only one or a few close others), anonymity (being
with others but unknown to them and unobserved, ‘lost in a crowd’), and reserve (being with others
but having erected a ‘psychological barrier against unwanted intrusion’). Id. In terms of the goals or
eﬀects of privacy, Westin described personal autonomy (which includes self-identity and the ability
to control communication and interaction with others); emotional release (the option of
withdrawing and being free from observation by others); self-evaluation (the possibility of reﬂecting
on one’s position vis-à-vis others); and protected communication (sharing conﬁdential things with
selected others). See also Koops et al., supra note 1, at 566 (building on Westin’s typology by
describing eight basic types of privacy occurring in four zones (personal, intimate, semi-private, and
public) with a ninth type, (informational privacy), which is described as “an overlay related to each
underlying type”).
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historically been deﬁned as an individual concern rather than a general
societal value or a public interest problem.”40 Classically, this is Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s notion of privacy as “the right to be let
alone.”41 Second, and relatedly, legal and policy remedies emphasize harm to
the individual.42 Legal doctrines such as informed consent become the
primary means of describing and regulating oﬀenses to individual autonomy.
The responsibility for identiﬁcation and redress of violations of informed
consent rests with the individual. Third, the “private” label describes its
substance or content and a belief that inadvertent disclosure could result in
embarrassment, unnecessary social tension, or negative consequences to the
individual or family members (such as one’s status as a sex oﬀender, recipient
of public welfare beneﬁts, or survivor of sexual assault).
B. How Disability Became a Private Fact
Contemporary privacy norms are byproducts of at least four key historical
ingredients: (1) a conceptual and regulatory divide between “public” and
“private” spheres; (2) the rise of the public welfare system; (3) the
development of health sciences, rehabilitation, and the medical profession;
and (4) in employment, “scientiﬁc management” and, separately, the
professionalization of human resources.
1. Separation of “Public” and “Private” Spheres
First, association of disability with the “private sphere” of family and care
outside of the public (and state’s) interests has shaped its treatment as private
information.43 This ﬁctious binary treats legal and policy matters related to
the home, relationships, the body, or caregiving (highly gendered) to be
James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[The
Founders] conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive
of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”). Interestingly, Justice Brandeis also valued
transparency and “sunlight” for the public good. See Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do,
HARPER’S WKLY., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10 (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .”).
42 See, e.g., Nehf, supra note 40, at 4 (describing survey results showing that while the public
holds data and information privacy as a priority, “a great number of [people also] understand that
[their] interests in privacy must be balanced against other interests, i.e., the multitude of beneﬁts
resulting from more eﬃcient government, business, and law enforcement functions when
information in digital form is readily accessible.”); see also Joseph I. Rosenbaum, Privacy On the
Internet: Whose Information is it Anyway?, 38 JURIMETRICS 565, 566 (1998) (recognizing the
diﬃculties of deﬁning privacy and its continued elusive nature because it is highly dependent on
technological capabilities and developments, and social norms and values).
43 See SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST AND PHILOSOPHICAL
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 40 (1996).
40
41
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outside of a “public sphere,” the home of legitimate state interests, such as
economic markets and state regulation.44 Privacy was billed as protective,
intended to shield the agency of individuals and households from state
overreaching.45 However, emphasis on legitimate zones of state regulation, at
least initially, gave states license to avoid duties to protect historically
vulnerable and marginalized groups (on the basis of race,46 gender,47 or sexual
identity48). For example, feminist legal theorists have well documented the
ways in which attaching a privacy label has “operated to make violence against
women legally and politically invisible.”49 The care and support for people
with disabilities through the mid-nineteenth century was left to families,
churches, and charities, in part, a function of its ontological ties to moral
depravity, punishment, and deviance.50 The state intervened to police
disability in public spaces through municipal ordinances and criminal laws
and, in its parens patriae function, to assure control over property.51 The
infamous “ugly laws,”52 for example, criminalized “unsightly beggar[s]” and
44

As Bart van der Sloot writes:
Privacy is perhaps the oldest legal principle. It pertains to the separation of the public
and private domain. Where that boundary lies exactly diﬀers from culture to culture,
epoch to epoch, and country to country, but there always is one. In ancient times, the
ruler or king had authority over the public domain, while the household fell under the
rule of the pater familias, the male breadwinner of the family, who reigned over his
family members like a king. The separation of the public domain from the private
domain, meant that public laws, in principle, held no sway over the household.

Bart van der Sloot, Privacy from a Legal Perspective, in THE HANDBOOK OF PRIVACY STUDIES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY INTRODUCTION 68-70 (Bart van der Sloot & Aviva de Groot eds., 2018)
(footnote omitted).
45 Id. at 70.
46 E.g., Christopher W. Schmidt, On Doctrinal Confusion: The Case of the State Action Doctrine, 2016
BYU L. REV. 575, 582, 615-16 (discussing the state action doctrine’s distinction between public and
private spheres and how the civil rights movement brought formerly “private” racial discrimination, for
example, in places of public accommodations, within the purview of state regulation).
47 See Frances Olsen, Constitutional Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, 10
CONST. COMMENT. 319, 322-23 (1993) (oﬀering an overview of early feminist critiques of the
“public/private distinction”).
48 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (“[T]he proposition that any kind of private
sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is
unsupportable.”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
49 Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
50 See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 94 (2000) (“In
colonial America, people with disabilities were viewed primarily in terms of their dependency. Wherever
possible, people with disabilities were cared for by their relatives, who often hid them out of shame.”).
51 See Harris, supra note 6, at 509-10 (discussing the evolution of guardianship proceedings as
a means for managing the property of people believed to be legally incompetent).
52 Marcia Pearce Burgdorf and Robert Burgdorf Jr. coined this term in 1975, but Susan Schweik
used it as the title of her book and expanded upon it greatly through her thorough discussion of the
legal history in this area. See generally SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN
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forced people with disabilities from public spaces by imposing hefty ﬁnes on
poor people who, when they expectedly could not pay, were conﬁned to
poorhouses and jails.53 These laws remained on the books well into the
twentieth century and were enforced (albeit infrequently) as late as 1974.54
Institutions, therefore, regulated the appearance of disability (and its related
marginalized identities).55 Disability was as a social eyesore, a personal
tragedy, and thus, a private fact to be hidden from those outside of the home.
People with disabilities became invisible, and as a result, “pitied, excluded,
and/or cared for outside of the mainstream of society.”56
Furthermore, the public-private divide forms the basis for the Supreme
Court’s privacy jurisprudence from Griswold v. Connecticut onward.57 For
example, in Whalen v. Roe, even as the Court upheld a New York law requiring
people taking certain controlled prescription drugs to ﬁle their names with
the state Health Department, it nevertheless recognized that these
individuals had a legitimate privacy interest in their medical data.58
Constitutional legal scholarship in the area of informational privacy is welldeveloped and beyond the scope of this project.59 One upshot of the literature
is that the Supreme Court understands information privacy as highly
individualized and rooted in three interests: to avoid disclosure of personal
matters; to maintain autonomy in personal decision-making; and to assimilate
whenever possible.60 Subsequent case law has shaped the scope of
PUBLIC (2009); Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a “Suspect Class” Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 855, 863 (1975) (coining the term “ugly laws”).
53 SCHWEIK, supra note 52, at 26-27 (noting that these nuisance ordinances imposed hefty ﬁnes
on oﬀenders—for example, the equivalent of over $350—but oﬀered an alternative for those unable
to pay: conﬁnement in the Almshouses).
54 Id. at 6.
55 Disability, like poverty, was often used as a proxy to regulate other disfavored identities.
Accordingly, no single explanation can account for the emergence of the policing of the unsightly
beggar in American culture. See id. at 24 (identifying “the persistent nexus of disability and poverty
at the heart of the ugly law, as well as . . . the complex interweaving of economic unrest, social policy
and cultural (including aesthetic) imagination at work”). As Professor Schweik notes, disability is
inherently intersectional, as the ugly laws were “a matrix of codes concerning local purity: decency
and exhibition, gender and sexuality.” Id. at 144; see also Harris, supra note 2, at 897 (identifying
sensory and behavioral markers associated with disability).
56 Feldblum, supra note 50, at 95.
57 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (extending the right of
privacy to abortion). In part, the connection between privacy and health allowed disability status to
move seamlessly into this framework. See generally Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional
Protection of Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133 (1991) (discussing the early development of
the Court’s informational privacy jurisprudence); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 737 (1989) (same).
58 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
59 See generally, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159 (2015).
60 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-600. As Robin Pierce summarizes it:
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constitutional protection, including the importation of doctrinal principles
such as “reasonable expectation of privacy” from the Fourth Amendment
doctrine.61 Courts apply an intermediate standard of review in such an
analysis and balance the privacy interests against the interests in disclosure
of personal information.62
2. Disability as Dependency
Second, the rise of the public welfare system, and state interest in its
regulation, shaped the treatment of disability as private information. The
“shameful” association of disability with state dependency caused many
people to reject disability as antithetical to American identity. Legal
historians mark the Civil War as a critical moment in the construction of
disability as part of national rhetoric of disfavored identity.63 The choice to
“cast disabled veterans as primarily disabled and dependent rather than as

Such decisions exist within the “private sphere”. This seemingly simple concept
frequently escalates in complexity when confronted with situations in which the
decision would appear to lie with the patient, but the interests of others are implicated
by the individual’s decision. This occurs, for example, in the case of infectious disease
and, in some jurisdictions, decisions regarding abortion. The operation of decisional
privacy can also be seen in the use of consent-substitutes such as advance directives
for care or research, a mechanism that is intended to perpetuate autonomy even after
the person loses the capacity to consent.
Robin Pierce, Medical Privacy: Where Deontology and Consequentialism Meet, in HANDBOOK OF
PRIVACY STUDIES, supra note 44, at 327, 329 (internal citations omitted).
61 See Nixon v. Admin’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (“[W]hen Government
intervention is at stake, public oﬃcials, including the President, are not wholly without
constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by
them in their public capacity.”); see also Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related
Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic,
82 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 148-49 (1994) (discussing the importation by the Court of “‘the legitimate
expectation of privacy’ standard from Fourth Amendment search and seizure decisions into a case
dealing with the violation of privacy interests through disclosure of personal information” (citing
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457-65)).
62 Doughty, supra note 61, at 149-50. Until recently, the abortion and gay rights jurisprudence
relied on the right of the plaintiﬀ to reveal no facts about themselves. Plaintiﬀs did not reveal facts
in either Roe or Bowers. In recent years, that strategy has ended. There are now briefs including
narratives about the lives of women who have had abortions or members of the LGBTQ+
community seeking to marry.
63 See, e.g., Rabia Belt, Ballots for Bullets?: Disabled Veterans and the Right to Vote, 69 STAN. L. REV.
435, 439 (2017) (“War was not just an engine of democracy. It was a factory of death and disability. As
it disabled, it transformed. Citizen-soldiers became dependent citizens. And this dependency carried
oft-detrimental political, social, and legal consequences.”); Peter Blanck, “The Right to Live in the
World”: Disability Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 367, 370 (2008) (“The
Civil War changed how Americans thought about disability. Attitudes were shaped about and by
returning disabled veterans and their families as they engaged the Civil War pension system.”).
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primarily veterans” worthy of public support had long-lasting eﬀects.64 The
veterans’ pension scheme was, at the time, the “nation’s largest and most
medicalized welfare scheme.”65 Payments initially required a causal
connection to war-related impairments as determined by means of a detailed
medical rating system for compensating “legitimate” disabilities.66 Veterans
received payments regardless of socioeconomic status. Later, however, the
federal government and states tied eligibility to pension beneﬁts to the
existence of a medically recognized disability and socioeconomic status as
indigent.67 Medical professionals and legal institutions—courts, public
agencies—became the gatekeepers of one’s public identity as “disabled” and,
by extension, access to limited pools of public beneﬁts including social
security, cash assistance, food stamps, and subsidized housing and health care.
Physicians rated claimants’ disabilities in relation to their ability to
participate in the labor market, sorting them by disease and severity.68
“Pensioners with visible or ‘less obscure’ injuries from gunshot wounds” were
subject to less attitudinal prejudice and were less likely to be rejected by the
Pension Bureau, while veterans with less visible, less common, and, thus, less
understood conditions faced attitudinal prejudice and skepticism, resulting in
higher rates of outright denial.69
Similarly, in the context of immigration law, disability was (and continues
to be) grounds for exclusion from the United States because of the
unquestioned assumption that disability means dependency.70 Ellis Island
Belt, supra note 63, at 443.
Blanck, supra note 63, at 370-71.
Id. at 371, 375-76. Later payments expanded to include disorders and diseases arising out of
war that caused disability later on. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 234, 17 Stat. 566; Act of June 27,
1890, ch. 634, 26 Stat. 182.
67 William P. Quigley, The Quicksands of the Poor Law: Poor Relief Legislation in a Growing Nation,
1790-1820, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 50 (1997) (discussing a change to the revolutionary war pension
scheme); Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and Disability Law, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081,
1105-1108 (2010) (discussing contemporary varied veterans’ beneﬁts programs including the meanstested Veterans Administration Pension Program).
68 Blanck, supra note 63, at 370-72.
69 Id. at 377.
70 Immigration laws once included explicit exclusions for persons with disabilities. See, e.g., Act
of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 2, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (excluding “lunatic[s], idiot[s], or any person unable to
take care of himself or herself without becoming a public charge” from entry to the United States);
see also Douglas C. Baynton, Defectives in the Land: Disability and American Immigration Policy, 18821924, 24 J. AM. ETHNIC HIST. 31, 33-34 (2005) (explaining how immigration laws denied admission
to “mental or physically defective [persons]” and to anyone with “any mental abnormality whatever”
(ﬁrst quoting Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898, 899; then quoting U.S. PUB. HEALTH
SERV., REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE MEDICAL INSPECTION OF ALIENS 30 (1917))). While
much of this exclusion has since been repealed, immigration law today explicitly maintains the
“public charge” language, while also excluding persons with “physical and mental disorder[s]” who
have “harmful behavior[s]” that pose a threat to oneself or others. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(A)
(“public charge”); id. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (“physical or mental disorder”).
64
65
66
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played a critical role in the construction of disability and its connotations.
State-imposed labels of illness, insanity, and criminality tracked racist and
xenophobic views of undesirability:
The social processing that Ellis Island engendered was all about identifying
and sometimes manufacturing abnormal bodies: these elements are out of
place; these bodies are disordered. . . . At Ellis Island, the categories of defect
and disability that adhere today were strongly grounded if not created, as was
the diagnostic gaze that allowed for the nebulous application of the stigma of
disability as we know it . . . .71

For example, when immigrants passed through Ellis Island, they “became
part of an indelible marking, [the immigrant] body was interrogated, written
across, and read into.”72 Interestingly, the very design of Ellis Island as a series
of stairs and pathways was a perfect mix of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon and
Henry Ford’s assembly line that oﬀered agents at Ellis Island the opportunity
to inspect immigrant bodies, behaviors, and minds with every step from
multiple angles. In this way, the construction of a maze of stairs tested
physical mobility, the requirement that they carry their luggage demonstrated
strength and endurance, and the winding maze operated like one big catwalk
for aesthetic inspection. Ellis Island also provided a testing ground for
empirical and rhetorical social sorting tools (e.g., IQ tests); it was “a genetic
experiment” facilitated by the expansion of medical science, as the next
subsection explains.73
3. Medical and Health Law Frames
Third, and relatedly, the increasing medicalization of disability in the late
nineteenth century reduced disability identity to a sum of medical diagnoses
deﬁned and controlled by medical professionals. This “medical model” of
disability locates the deﬁciency in the person rather than in relation to how
social institutions respond to individual impairment.74 In other words, a
71 Jay Dolmage, Disabled upon Arrival: The Rhetorical Construction of Disability and Race at Ellis
Island, 77 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 24, 26 (2011).
72 Id. at 24.
73 Id. at 27-28.
74 See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 IND. L.J. 181, 185-86 (2008) (footnote
omitted) (“The medical model views the physiological condition itself as the problem. In other
words, ‘the individual is the locus of [ . . .] disability.’” (quoting Mary Crossley, The Disability
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649 (1999))); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 426-31 (2000) (describing the medical model of
disability as one that “treat[s] disability as an inherent personal characteristic that should ideally be
ﬁxed, rather than as a characteristic that draws its meaning from social context”); Elizabeth F.
Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1401 (“The medical model is the idea, common
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wheelchair user is disabled by the design choice of stairs rather than by a
mobility impairment itself. The medical model describes disability as an
abnormal, personal defect or impairment in need of medical correction, cure,
or mitigation relative to an able-bodied, nondisabled “ﬁt” or “healthy,”
athletic male.75 Medical professionals and researchers sought ways to identify,
label, and diagnose disabilities. At times, the explicit goal was the eradication
of disability76 and, at other times, the goal was treatment, cure, or
rehabilitation.77 For example, the modern practice of ﬁngerprinting and its
related data collection comes from a eugenic policy initiative to track and
mark disability.78 In this way, medical diagnoses and medical data become
synonymous (and conﬂated) with disability identity, placing its construction,
evaluation, and legitimacy in the hands of medical professionals. While there
is certainly a connection between someone who has a medical condition, for
example, AIDS or status as HIV positive, this does not necessarily track
whether the person identiﬁes with disability as a sociopolitical identity.79
The beneﬁts of nondisclosure of disability (with invisible or less apparent
disabilities), shaped directly by legislation, have outweighed the beneﬁts of
publicly claiming disability for many people. Consider the incentives for
nondisclosure. Laws codiﬁed the gatekeeping role of the medical profession
to mainstream portrayals, that disability is an individual medical problem.”). Consider how the
Hippocratic Oath itself developed and maintained to ensure candor and allow doctors to get the
best most accurate information from patients to help with medical treatment. If doctors (like
lawyers) did not oﬀer this protection, the accepted wisdom goes, then people would be more reticent
to oﬀer embarrassing or damaging information and/or seek care.
75 See ROSEMARIE GARLAND THOMSON, EXTRAORDINARY BODIES: FIGURING PHYSICAL
DISABILITY IN AMERICAN CULTURE AND LITERATURE 12 (1997) (coining the notion of the
“normate” or culturally constructed corporeal normativity); Lennard J. Davis, Introduction:
Normality, Power, and Culture, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 1, 6 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 4th
ed. 2013) (discussing the ﬁtness of the body and its connection to eugenics and national identity).
76 See Davis, supra note 75, at 4 (“[O]ne of the inducements to making these inquiries into
personal identification has been to discover independent features suitable for hereditary investigation
. . . . [I]t is not improbable, and worth taking pains to inquire whether each person may not carry
visibly about his body undeniable evidence of his parentage and near kinships.” (citing DONALD A.
MACKENZIE, STATISTICS IN BRITAIN, 1865-1930, at 65 (1981) (quoting Sir Francis Galton)))).
77 This was the driving ideology for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973—as the name suggests, it is
spending clause legislation designed to provide a remedy for discrimination in federally funded
employment, programs, and services to move people with disabilities into the formal economy and
reduce reliance on public welfare. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-18).
78 Data collection dates back to the early eﬀorts of Sir Francis Galton, a key ﬁgure in the
international eugenics movements, to develop our modern system of ﬁngerprinting, “a kind of serial
number written on the body.” Davis, supra note 75, at 4. Fingerprinting then develops as a way to
identify, track, and “out” criminals who wished to hide their ﬂawed and deviant identities. Id.
79 This is true even if the person meets the federal definition of disability under disability rights
laws such as the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The term “disability” means, with respect to an
individual, one who meets the federal threshold definition of disability—that is, “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
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by requiring explicit diagnoses for eligibility for public beneﬁts and “proof ”
from medical experts of deservedness. States embraced medical diagnoses as
neutral, empirical proof of deservedness of a limited social safety net and the
beneﬁts of citizenship. Claiming disability could mean experiencing stigma,
and more concretely, systemic exclusion from voting,80 marriage,81
parenting,82 and even procreation.83 In fact, involuntary sterilization laws
advanced societal norms of disability as deﬁcit and dependency with our
nation’s highest Court’s blessing in Buck v. Bell.84 Such views of disabled lives
as sad, depressing, and lacking in value persist today.85 A recent study of
80 In thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia, persons deemed “incapacitated” or
“incompetent” as a result of mental disorder may be stripped of their voting rights. Matt
Vasilogambros, Thousands Lose Right to Vote Under ‘Incompetence’ Laws, PEW (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/03/21/thousands-loseright-to-vote-under-incompetence-laws [https://perma.cc/EZ2A-R4V4]; see, e.g., ALA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 177(b) (“No person . . . who is mentally incompetent . . . shall be qualiﬁed to vote until . . .
removal of disability.”).
81 See, e.g., Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and Support
Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 567 (2006) (explaining that under 20 C.F.R. § 416.412,
individuals with disabilities who marry lose money under social security programs).
82 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-319(a)(2) (2019) (providing that “[e]motional illness, mental
illness, or mental deﬁciency of the parent, or excessive use of alcohol or controlled substances, of a
duration or nature as to render the parent unable to care for needs of the child” is a ground for
terminating parental rights); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE:
ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 16 (2012),
https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_Parenting_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WL8VLC8] (“Fully two-thirds of dependency statutes allow the court to reach the determination that a parent
is unﬁt (a determination necessary to terminate parental rights) on the basis of the parent’s disability.
In every state, disability may be considered in determining the best interest of a child for purposes
of a custody determination in family or dependency court.”); id. (“Removal rates where parents have
a psychiatric disability have been found to be as high as 70 percent to 80 percent; where the parent
has an intellectual disability, 40 percent to 80 percent. In families where the parental disability is
physical, 13 percent have reported discriminatory treatment in custody cases.”). See generally
CHILD.’S BUREAU, GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS (2017),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/groundtermin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9U7C-PBST] (discussing state statutes providing for the termination of parental rights by
a court).
83 See generally David Pfeiffer, Eugenics and Disability Discrimination, 9 DISABILITY & SOC. 481
(1994) (documenting the history of involuntary sterilization laws targeting individuals with disabilities).
84 274 U.S. 200 (1927). For discussions of the implications of Buck v. Bell, see generally
Jasmine E. Harris, Commentary to Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS:
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE REWRITTEN 15 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson ed., 2020), and Jasmine E.
Harris, Why Buck v. Bell Still Matters, BILL OF HEALTH, HARV. L. SCH. PETRIE-FLOM CTR.
(Oct. 14, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/10/14/why-buck-v-bell-still-matters
[https://perma.cc/DZK7-EEA8].
85 See, e.g., Sarah Maslin Nir, A Dozen Calls to Child Abuse Hotline Did Not Save 8-Year-Old Boy,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/02/nyregion/nypd-cop-autisticson.html [https://perma.cc/7YMT-F7TC] (describing the horriﬁc abuse of an autistic child by his
father); Corina Knoll, Sweethearts Forever. Then Came Alzheimer’s, Murder and Suicide, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/nyregion/alzheimers-murder-suicide.html
[https://perma.cc/PGB8-FLKG] (framing husband’s murder of wife with Alzheimer’s as “a new love
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physicians’ perceptions of the quality of disabled lives, for example, found
that 82.4% reported that people with a signiﬁcant disability have a worse
quality of life than nondisabled people and only 40.7% of physicians surveyed
were “very conﬁdent” about their ability to provide the same quality of care
to disabled and nondisabled patients.86
4. “Scientiﬁc Management” and the Professionalization of HR
Two additional factors in the context of employment have also contributed
to the treatment of disability as private and have increased the costs of claiming
disability.87 First, “scientific management,” or the trend toward greater
optimization, has created an environment where employers engineer one “best”
method of job performance. In doing so, employers create the “ideal worker”
who can perform those specific tasks in the method prescribed without
deviation.88 The very notion of disability accommodations requires flexibility
with the methods of performing what are deemed the essential functions of the
job title. Not only does scientific management remove discretion from the
employees as to the process of accomplishing a stated work goal, it also removes
discretion from supervisors in direct contact with employees to make small
adjustments that might allow an employee with a disability to reach the
ultimate goal of the position by following a different process.
Related to scientiﬁc management is the professionalization of human
resources compliance duties, which has also left line supervisors with less
discretion to accommodate disability. Like the scientiﬁc management trend,
professionalization of human resources reduces manager autonomy and
ownership over compliance responsibilities, albeit in diﬀerent ways. Unlike
scientiﬁc management which removes discretion in the name of overall
story”). Recent examples abound in state responses to the coronavirus pandemic. See generally
Jasmine E. Harris, Essay, The Frailty of Disability Rights, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 29 (2020);
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Who Gets the Ventilator? Disability Discrimination in COVID-19 MedicalRationing Protocols, 130 YALE L.J.F. 1 (2020).
86 Lisa I. Iezzoni, Sowmya R. Rao, Julie Ressalam, Dragana Bolcic-Jankovic, Nicole D.
Agaronnik, Karen Donelan, Tara Lagu & Eric G. Campbell, Physicians’ Perceptions of People with
Disability and Their Health Care, 40 HEALTH AFFS. 297, 300 (2021). These statistics offer empirical
support for claims of differential care by some people with disabilities during the pandemic. See, e.g.,
Joseph Shapiro, One Man’s COVID-19 Death Raises the Worst Fears of Many People with Disabilities, NPR
(Jul. 31, 2020, 3:29 PM) https://www.npr.org/2020/07/31/896882268/one-mans-covid-19-death-raisesthe-worst-fears-of-many-people-with-disabilities [https://perma.cc/6M56-P7TR] (discussing the
death of forty-six-year-old Michael Hickson, a Black man with quadriplegia in a Texas hospital).
87 I thank Professor Danielle D’Onfro for her thoughts here.
88 See Peter Cappelli, Stop Overengineering People Management: The Trend Towards Optimization
is Disempowering Employees, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.–Oct. 2020, at 56, 59 (“Labor is treated as a
commodity, and the goal is to cut it to a minimum by replacing employees with contract and gig
workers . . . . Ideal behaviors are dictated to the remaining employees, who are closely monitored
for compliance.”).
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optimization, the professionalization of human resources has created a
climate where managers are told to refer anything plausibly related to
compliance issues to human resources.89 Thus, whereas a request to a manager
for time to go to a doctor’s appointment might ordinarily be decided by the
supervisor on the ground, the professionalization of human resources might
now require that every such request be processed formally through their
system and discussed through a privacy lens on behalf of the individual
employee. Ironically, while compliance and human resource departments
have expanded, there is often a mismatch between expertise and authority.
By professionalizing compliance with the ADA and removing discretion at
the local supervisory level, HR may have counterintuitively incurred costs
and imposed greater administrative burdens that deter employees from
pursuing and securing reasonable accommodations.
II. THE LOGIC OF PRIVACY
Part II explains why some legal scholars have called for greater privacy as
a prophylaxis for contemporary forms of discrimination.90 The argument that
privacy advances individual liberties is well developed outside of the
disability space and regularly imported into the disability context.91 Alan
Westin, one of the early theorists on privacy law (pre-internet) framed
privacy as control.92 Other proponents of privacy frame privacy as an interest
held by the individual to control information as a way of controlling access to
their lives; others emphasize the importance of privacy to the development
of meaningful social relationships. Some scholars argue, therefore, that
89 See Julia Borggraefe, Human Resources Governance and Compliance: Introduction and Overview,
in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1051, 1056-57 (Matthias Zeuch ed., 2016)
(“If HR therefore is responsible for creating HR compliance standards, HR also must be empowered
to instruct executives and to conduct consequences in case the rules have not been complied with.
Rules have to be binding and people—be it employees or executives—must be aware of this.”).
90 See, e.g., Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information
Exchange Under Employment Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 56 & n.27 (2016) (listing scholars advocating
for privacy protections in antidiscrimination laws but challenging blanket reliance on privacy);
Sharona Hoﬀman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1483, 1533-36 (2011) (highlighting the absence of protections in federal
antidiscrimination law for marital and parental status); Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old
Problem, New Tactic: Making the Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based on
Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1465-66 (2007) (calling for federal law that explicitly
proscribes discrimination on the basis of family status).
91 A detailed discussion about privacy debates among legal scholars is beyond the scope of this
Article. However, the arguments advanced in this Article contribute to the broader debates by
oﬀering an anomaly—disability.
92 WESTIN, supra note 39, at 22-24; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32
CONN. L. REV. 815, 836 (2000) (mapping privacy along a continuum with “liberal” at one end
representing privacy as individual control over personal information).
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information control better serves the exercise of meaningful decisional
agency for individuals.
More recent privacy scholarship, such as the work of Anita Allen, explores
the “politics of sensitive data.”93 Allen describes the absence of “racial
privacy” and argues that race does not receive the same legal protections
aﬀorded health, education, or ﬁnancial data and questions the reasoning for
its exclusion from formal legal protection.94 Rather than ban racial
identiﬁcation to help redress a history of racial subordination, indignity, and
denial of fundamental rights, Allen states, U.S. law requires classiﬁcation
based on race.95 However, strong privacy protections for racial data in a
remedial system requiring statistical proof of disparate impact, for example,
may undermine broader goals of antidiscrimination law.96
Disability antidiscrimination scholars, building on this broader privacy
literature, often advance four interrelated arguments in support of data
privacy: self-determination, avoidance of disability stigma, algorithmic
discrimination, and the imperfections of our current antidiscrimination safety
net to remedy implicit and institutional biases.
A. Self-Determination and Decisional Autonomy
While some scholars assert a utilitarian view of privacy, others adopt a
deontological position, arguing that privacy is critical for self-determination
and self-care, both foundational components of the formation of the
contemporary liberal subject.97 Accordingly, some health and disability law
scholars take a very aggressive position on privacy in the disability context.
Professor Jessica Roberts, for example, astutely ties privacy law to
antidiscrimination law, arguing that these two areas tend to be siloed given
the focus of the former on individual autonomy and the latter on equality of
groups.98 The appeal of privacy law as part of the disability antidiscrimination
93 ALLEN, supra note 36, at 123-24; see also Anita L. Allen, Race, Face, and Rawls, 72 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1677, 1683-86 (2004) (“Government should not act so as to call attention to facts on record
about a person [such as race] that will result in the person’s being an object of perhaps unwanted,
perhaps negative scrutiny.”).
94 ALLEN, supra note 36, at 124.
95 Id. at 125.
96 For an interesting discussion of racial privacy in the context of tax law, see Jeremy BearerFriend, Should the IRS Know Your Race?: The Challenge of Colorblind Tax Data, 73 TAX L. REV. 1, 37
(2019), which argues that the IRS’s colorblind data collection undermines broader equity goals
because it fails to capture the ways tax policies have disparate impacts on racial minorities.
97 See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 189 (2008).
98 See, e.g., Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Future of Employee
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 710 (2019) (arguing that privacy norms and legislation promote
antidiscrimination); Roberts, supra note 6, at 2099-103 (calling for privacy and health law to come
together as a means of promoting antidiscrimination). Professor Roberts’s work has focused on the
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agenda, she argues, centers on two main points. First, privacy law is
administratively simpler to enforce than a more complex and nuanced system
of disclosure.99 Second, strict privacy protections are preemptive, meaning
that a potential plaintiﬀ does not wait for harm to actualize before bringing a
claim.100 This, of course, works only when the disfavored identity trait can be
masked or is not immediately apparent. Even scholars who might have
historically questioned privacy are now more skeptical given the explosion of
big data mining and algorithmic discrimination that seeks to make decisions
based on select variables about a person’s life, behavior, and history. These
scholars, as a result, tend toward more explicit and comprehensive data
protection for individuals as a shield against discrimination, particularly in
the workplace.101
Other scholars, serious about the dangers of disclosure of disability, call
for heightened tort protections as a way to supplement existing
antidiscrimination laws. For example, greater recognition of the tort of
invasion of privacy might oﬀer greater employee protection for misuse of
genetic information by employers.102 Broader tort liability may also enhance
the dignity of people with disabilities (especially disabled people of color) as
they are often the subject of state policing and surveillance.103
B. Avoidance of Disability Stigma
Second, identiﬁcation as a disabled person has subjected people with
disabilities to inexplicable privacy invasions including involuntary
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) and has framed GINA as an
antidiscrimination statute because of the privacy protections in place. See, e.g., id. at 2101.
99 See Roberts, supra note 6, at 2121 (“Because [antidiscrimination laws] simply prohibit
decisions based on protected status, they do not seek to prevent the preceding diﬀerentiation or
value assignment that makes those decisions possible.”).
100 See id. (“Privacy law has the power to cut the process of discrimination short.”).
101 See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CALIF.
L. REV. 735, 738-39, 772 (2017) (arguing that current laws are generally insufficient to guard against
intrusive worker surveillance, the product of new technologies and the decreased costs of surveillance).
102 See William R. Corbett, The Need for a Revitalized Common Law of the Workplace, 69 BROOK.
L. REV. 91, 154 (2003) (“Regarding genetic discrimination, tort theory could augment the coverage
already provided by the Americans with Disabilities Act and state genetic discrimination laws.”); see
also Mark P. Gergen, A Grudging Defense of the Role of the Collateral Torts in Wrongful Termination
Litigation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1693 (1996) (discussing common law claims brought in cases also alleging
violations of various civil rights statutes). In fact, several cases allege violations of the ADA’s
conﬁdentiality provisions and secondary claims for invasion of privacy under state tort law.
103 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic Understanding of
Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (1999) (“The intentional torts are not the only tort causes
of action that protect dignitary interests. The torts of invasion of privacy and defamation do so as
well.”); see also Jane Bowling, Workplaces Fraught with Potential for Invasions of Privacy, Panel Finds,
DAILY REC. (Balt.), June 17, 1996, at 17 (suggesting that employers increasingly face invasion of
privacy suits if they reveal medical information about employees with disabilities).
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sterilization and medical testing;104 continuous surveillance by the state,
medical providers, and support personnel; and the denial of decisional
agency.105 This recent history oﬀers strong incentives for those without the
aesthetic markers to cover or pass as nondisabled and avoid the consequences
of disability stigma in social and professional interactions.106 The legislative
history of the ADA, for example, highlights the impossible dilemma facing
people with less apparent disabilities: “I wish to remind you that many of us
have hidden disabilities. We often risk discrimination by the very act of
disclosing our disability. Once disclosure is risked, we have little recourse
when denial of accommodation and exclusion occur.”107
In this sense, privacy law and policies insulate people with less visible
disabilities from public scrutiny and prejudice.108 When given a choice to
disclose or not, even if it means forgoing legally mandated reasonable
accommodations, a person capable of covering or passing as nondisabled has
good reason to seek the protection of self-accommodation and nondisclosure.
Erving Goﬀman’s classic work on stigma details how these social relations
play out and how they limit the life choices of those subject to the explicit
and implicit negative attitudes of others.109
C. Algorithmic Discrimination
Third, nondisclosure of disability may avoid certain forms of algorithmic
discrimination. Even when a person chooses not to disclose in the workplace,
the ability to be selectively “out” in one’s social life is increasingly diﬃcult.
Machine-learning (and other artiﬁcial intelligence tools (AI)) allow
Harris, supra note 2, at 919-20.
See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TURNING RIGHTS INTO REALITY: HOW
GUARDIANSHIP AND ALTERNATIVES IMPACT THE AUTONOMY OF PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL
AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 72-73 (2019), https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_TurningRights-into-Reality_508_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TM4-9XJM] (describing how people with
intellectual and developmental disabilities experience “a regression of their decision-making abilities”
after a guardian is appointed).
106 GOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 102-04.
107 Oversight Hearing on H.R. 4498, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988 Before the Subcomm.
on Select Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 100th Cong. 80 (1988) (statement of Marcie Roth,
Supervising Advocate, WE CAHR).
108 See, e.g., J. Alexander Short, Opinion, Stopping Stigma: The Necessity of Privacy Protections,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.pennlive.com/opinion/2020/02/stopping-stigma-thenecessity-of-privacy-protections-opinion.html [https://perma.cc/WR4R-MJMN] (“Unlike many
other diseases, disclosure of [substance use disorder] regularly invokes unique repercussions.
Whether it be the loss of parental rights, employment, housing, or insurance, the stakes are
incredibly high. As such, protecting the privacy of such disclosures is imperative for this population
to access healthcare without the devastating fear of negative repercussions.”).
109 See GOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 104 (“[T]he hard of hearing learn to talk with the degree of loudness
that listeners feel is appropriate . . . . [T]he blind sometimes learn to look directly at the speaker . . . .”).
104
105
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institutional actors to amass consumer data that can identify individuals as
disabled without their knowledge or consent.110
Predictive algorithms focused on “safety” or “dangerousness” present
similar challenges. After the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, for
instance, Governor Rick Scott signed the “Marjory Stoneman Douglas Public
Safety Act,” a “red ﬂag” law, which, among other provisions, directs the
Florida Department of Education to work with the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement and create a “centralized integrated data repository and
data analytics resources.”111 This repository collects data on students with
mental disabilities and behavioral problems, among others, whom public
agencies think are potential school safety risks. The types of information
populating the database include “Good Samaritan” reports, state and local
sources such as social media, district special education records, the
Department of Children and Families, the Department of Law Enforcement,
the Department of Juvenile Justice, and records from local law enforcement.112
Government agencies and private contractors argue that there is a signiﬁcant
need to share conﬁdential information quickly and, in emergency situations,
they should be exempt from potential violations of federal and state privacy
and education conﬁdentiality laws.113 Civil liberty groups such as the
Southern Poverty Law Center and the Florida chapter of the American Civil
Liberties Union have raised concerns about erroneous predictions of risk and
future violence that will negatively and disproportionately aﬀect students
with disabilities and those with disciplinary records who also are
disproportionately male students of color.114

110 Mason Marks, Algorithmic Disability Discrimination, in DISABILITY, HEALTH, LAW AND
BIOETHICS 242, 242 (I. Glenn Cohen, Carmel Shachar, Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein eds., 2020)
(“In the past, disability-related information flowed between people with disabilities and their doctors,
family members, and friends. However, AI-based tools . . . allow corporations . . . to bypass the laws
protecting people with disabilities and infer consumers’ disabilities without their knowledge or consent.”).
111 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, ch. 2018-3, § 21, 2018 Fla. Laws 6, 40.
112 Id. The public discourse on mental and psychosocial disabilities, despite sound data to the
contrary, continues to tie mental illness to violence, particularly gun violence. Jonathan M. Metzl &
Kenneth T. MacLeish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the Politics of American Firearms, 105 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 240, 247 (2015).
113 See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
114 See What Does the “Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act” Mean for Students?,
ACLU FLA., https://www.aclufl.org/en/what-does-marjory-stoneman-douglas-high-school-public-safetyact-mean-students [https://perma.cc/MU2Y-GCAJ] (highlighting increased youth arrests and disparate
treatment of minorities as risks); Greg Allen, Florida Could Serve as Example for Lawmakers Considering Red
Flag Laws, NPR (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/21/752815318/florida-could-serveas-example-for-lawmakers-considering-red-flag-laws [https://perma.cc/7ZT8-UT7R] (discussing Florida’s
red flag laws as examples for other states). Consider the effects of other identities such as class or
immigration status on listing in the database.
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Categorical nondisclosure, therefore, prevents inadvertent secondary
disclosure and, as such, may permit the individual ongoing control of the
information to make select disclosures as desired. In an age of data mining,
sharing, and AI, however, the ability to control information about one’s
identity gets harder each day.115 For this reason, scholars equate privacy with
dignity, autonomy, and stigma avoidance, even going so far as to frame
privacy as a human right for people with disabilities.116
D. The Imperfections of Existing Antidiscrimination Laws
The prevalence of disability bias in society, according to some disability
law scholars, demands a strong privacy preference to prevent
discrimination.117 Consider the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) statistics tracking complaints ﬁled correlating with
type of disability. The EEOC data reﬂect the prevalence of less visible
disabilities among EEOC complaints, suggesting that, “at least in getting
hired, the apparent absence of disability makes a diﬀerence.”118
Privacy laws, then, on balance, may be a more direct remedy for misuse of
disability information than existing antidiscrimination laws that impose
onerous burdens of proof that do not mirror contemporary forms of
discrimination. For example, aggrieved plaintiffs need only show that the
disability related information was either wrongfully obtained (without consent)
or improperly disseminated. Privacy laws, in this respect, may better redress
discrimination that is not captured by our equality laws. The prime example
here is the difficulty of proving intent and causation in antidiscrimination laws,
creating particular challenges for responding to unconscious biases. Privacy
laws may avoid the challenge of investigating intent by engaging in a relatively

115 See Carsten Maple, Security and Privacy in the Internet of Things, 2 J. CYBER POL’Y 155, 155
(2017) (“The growth in the number of devices and the speed of that growth presents challenges to
our security and freedoms . . . .”).
116 See, e.g., Jonathan Lazar, Brian Wentz & Marco Winckler, Information Privacy and Security
as a Human Right for People with Disabilities, in DISABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 199, 202 (Jonathan Lazar & Michael Ashley Stein eds., 2017) (stating that the
“human right to information privacy and security is critical for persons with disabilities” and thus
framing privacy as a human right for people with disabilities).
117 See Areheart & Roberts, supra note 98, at 710 (contending that privacy protection promotes
antidiscrimination); Roberts, supra note 6, at 2099-2103.
118 Mark C. Weber, Privacy Protection and Disability Discrimination in a Social Context 2
(2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author); see also ADA Charge Data by Impairment/Bases
– Resolutions (Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 1997 – FY 2019, U.S. EQUAL EMP. COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-resolutions.cfm
[https://perma.cc/4NCEPA9R] (presenting EEOC resolution statistics which show that those with less apparent disabilities
consistently ﬁle the most complaints).
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“straightforward factual inquiry” into whether a defendant attempted to obtain
certain kinds of protected information.119
The ADA provides protection against preemployment conditional-oﬀer
medical exams and inquiries and limits post-employment examinations and
inquiries.120 These protections provided innovative solutions to disability
discrimination at the hiring stage and, undoubtedly, have helped prevent
discrimination in employment in many cases. However, some disability
scholars remain skeptical that these provisions oﬀer meaningful protection
against disability discrimination in an age of big data.121 The use of predictive
algorithms in employment settings weighs heavily against disclosure,
particularly at the hiring stage, when the ADA is perhaps least eﬀective at
combating disability discrimination.
III. PRIVACY NORMS AS ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
The understanding that disability identity was and, normatively, should
be a private matter continues to shape disability rights today. The law nudges
privacy in two ways. Sometimes the law explicitly states that information
about a person’s disability ought to be kept private. Other times, the law oﬀers
remedies that focus on the “harmful” consequences of disclosure. While
modern iterations of privacy are not always direct shoves into the disability
closet as they were during state-sponsored eugenics and institutionalization,
contemporary disability law tips the scales in favor of covering and passing,
for those who can do so, rather than creating the conditions for publicly
claiming disability identity. This section oﬀers some examples of privacy
nudges operating in disability, procedural, education, and tort law.122
A. Disability Antidiscrimination Law
I will discuss three main examples of privacy nudges in disability
antidiscrimination law: (1) the ADA deﬁnition of disability, (2) the tension
between disclosure and conﬁdentiality provisions under the ADA, and (3) the

Roberts, supra note 6, at 2154.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2), (4); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.13 (2020).
Areheart & Roberts, supra note 98, at 764 (citing Mark A. Rothstein, GINA at Ten and the
Future of Genetic Nondiscrimination Law, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May–June 2018, at 3, 6) (“Of course,
in the age of big data, when employers can access information through a variety of sources other
than medical examinations and inquiries, the ADA’s privacy protections look obsolete.”); see also
Sharon Hoﬀman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 786-88
(2017) (describing the ADA’s shortcomings with big data).
122 Not all disability rights laws advance only privacy norms. Rather, this Part shows how some
of the key celebrated aspects of these laws use privacy as part of their remedial mechanisms.
119
120
121
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treatment of disability identity as proprietary under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 (Rehab Act).
1. The ADA Deﬁnition of Disability
First, courts have struggled with the intended scope of coverage of the
ADA which is, in part, a reﬂection of misperceptions about the incidence of
disability in society and the scope of Congress’s intended protection. The
ADA deﬁnes a person with a disability as a person having a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; a
person with a record of such an impairment; or someone regarded as having
such an impairment.123 The ﬁrst eighteen years of the ADA cultivated judicial
backlash as courts wrestled with the threshold category of disability and who
could claim standing to sue under the ADA.124 In 1999, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in three cases—the Sutton trilogy125—seeking clarity on the
legal deﬁnition of disabled under the ADA, speciﬁcally, the deﬁnition of
“substantially limits” used to deﬁne “disability” under the statute.126
This question required the Court to determine whether Congress
intended to include in the deﬁnition of disability those individuals who could
employ “mitigating measures”—deﬁned as medication, assistive technology
or other ameliorative devices.127 If an individual self-accommodated and it

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability,
in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 62, 65-66 (Linda
Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003) (“Judges view the ADA as a form of public beneﬁt program for people
with disabilities, rather than as a mandate for equality.”); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Foreword—
Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7 (2000) (describing a “powerful narrowing trend in the federal
judiciary, especially on the foundational question of who was a ‘person with a disability’ entitled to
protection under the Act”).
125 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999) (holding that the determination of
disability under the ADA should be made considering an individual’s ability to mitigate the current
impairment through corrective measures, which accords with the statutory language and history of
the ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (citing Sutton to hold that
the determination of disability under the ADA is made considering available mitigating
circumstances); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 563-66 (1999) (holding that not all
physical difficulties render an individual per se “disabled” under the ADA, but that disability is proven
on an individual basis showing that an alleged disability substantially impacts a major life activity).
126 The ADA as promulgated by Congress in 1990 deﬁned disability as an “impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
127 Examples of such measures include:
123
124

(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances, low-vision devices (which
do not include ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and
devices, hearing aids and cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices,
mobility devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies;(II) use of assistive
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worked, but still experienced discrimination in the workplace on the basis of
an actual, prior, or perceived disability, the Supreme Court held, Congress
intended to exclude him from the legal deﬁnition of disability. The expressive
value of these holdings signaled a pervasive public distrust with disability and
a desire to ensure limited remedial access to those with “legitimate”
disabilities, deﬁned by the Supreme Court as unassimilable impairments,
those a disabled person could not self-accommodate to achieve “normalcy.”128
Congress promulgated the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in direct
response to the Sutton trilogy and instructed federal courts (especially, the
highest court) to adopt a broad interpretation of the deﬁnition of disability
in accordance with its original statutory intent.129 The ADAAA also reiterates
Congress’s intent to remedy what it deemed to be the core of disability
discrimination: negative stereotypes of deﬁcit and incapacity (and not always
overt animus) that permeated all areas of interaction and association with
disability. This insight is clearest in the “regarded as” prong of the deﬁnition
of disability which extends protection under the ADA to people without
actual or records of impairments who nevertheless face discrimination based
on a perception that they have a disability.130
2. The Tension Between Disclosure and Conﬁdentiality
Second, the ADA sets up an awkward tension between disclosure and
privacy. The baseline rule is that employers “shall not make inquiries of an
employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as
to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry
is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”131 In
addition, Congress designed the process for requesting reasonable
accommodations under Title I of the ADA to be interactive. “In many
instances, both the disability and the type of accommodation required will be
obvious, and thus there may be little or no need to engage in any discussion.”132
technology; (III) reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or (IV)
learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modiﬁcations.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i).
128 See e.g., Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519 (describing the petitioner as someone who “can function
normally and can engage in activities that other persons normally do” (quoting Murphy v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan. 1996))).
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note (“The purposes of this Act . . . are . . . to reject the requirement
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its
companion cases . . . .”).
130 Id. § 12101(a)(2), (8).
131 Id. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
132 U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC-CVG-2003-1 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
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The ADA streamlines the process for individuals who manifest the aesthetics
of disability and instructs employers to presume statutory eligibility. Those
without visible markers of disability, however, must undergo a process of
proving eligibility by litigating the existence of a covered disability.
To obtain a reasonable accommodation in the workplace under Title I for
those with less apparent disabilities, a person must first request an
accommodation by disclosing their disability.133 When the disability is “not
obvious” an employer may ask the individual for “reasonable documentation”
about functional limitations and the ability to perform the “essential functions”
of the position.134 Conversely, an employer may violate Title I if she requests
documentation of a disability when “both the disability and need for reasonable
accommodation are obvious,”135 further demarcating the line between legitimate
disabilities (those who bear the markers) and those who have to perform socially
constructed perceptions of disability to access rights. The EEOC’s guidance
explains that “[t]he employer is entitled to know that the individual has a covered
disability for which s/he needs a reasonable accommodation.”136
Legal doctrine signals that disclosure is potentially costly. For example, if
an employee voluntarily discloses disability outside of the reasonable
accommodations process and the employer learns about it, the employee may
lose certain legal protections, such as the presumed conﬁdentiality of that
information, which may damage the employee’s case for disability
discrimination under the ADA. In Rohan v. Networks Presentation LLC, the
plaintiﬀ claimed she was forced to disclose to her co-workers her mental
impairment, history of trauma, and treatment in violation of the ADA’s
conﬁdentiality provisions.137 The court held that because the disclosure was
voluntary and not the result of a medical exam or inquiry initiated the
employer, the ADA did not mandate conﬁdentiality.138 Rohan discourages
disclosure because the person making such disclosure lacks the ability to
control subsequent (and perhaps unintended) use of the information.
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held, in EEOC v. Thrivent Financial for
Lutherans, that disability related information voluntarily disclosed by an
employee to an employer outside of a former medical inquiry did not preclude
the former employer from providing this information to other potential

DISABILITIES ACT (2002) (emphasis added), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html
[https://perma.cc/XA88-B7HH] [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE].
133 Id.
134 Id. (deﬁning “essential function” as a “fundamental duty” of a position).
135 Id.
136 Id. (emphasis added).
137 175 F. Supp. 2d 806, 813 (D. Md. 2001).
138 Id. at 808, 813-14.
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employers as part of a reference check.139 The EEOC argued that the
defendant, Thrivent, revealed information about plaintiff Messier’s migraine
condition to prospective employers in violation of the ADA’s confidentiality
requirement.140 “The district court found that Thrivent learned of Messier’s
migraine condition outside the context of a medical examination or inquiry.”141
Therefore, the confidentiality provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3) did not
apply, and Thrivent had no duty to treat knowledge of Messier’s migraine
condition as a confidential medical record in accordance with the ADA.142
The ADA prohibits employers from making preemployment inquiries
about disability, recognizing the diﬃculty in building a failure to hire claim
as discussed above. People with more apparent disabilities, such as wheelchair
users, may choose to disclose disability preemployment to ensure that the
interview itself, if in person, is accessible. Similarly, a deaf person or someone
with low hearing may disclose disability to ensure the availability of
interpretation services. The EEOC agency guidance permits employers in
the preemployment process, if a disability is obvious, known, or voluntarily
disclosed, to ask the applicant if she requires a reasonable accommodation.143
But consider a blind applicant’s initial interview. Although disability is likely
the elephant in the room and, in some cases, highly visible to the employer,
the employer’s risk aversion may prevail and dissuade the employer from
asking about the need for reasonable accommodations. This leaves the
employer to imagine the accommodations needed (and costs attached) and
the blind person to wonder what eﬀect a cane or other aesthetic markers will
have on her chances of getting the job.
For some less visible disabilities, a person may not disclose at all because
of concerns about bias at the hiring stage and the diﬃculty of proving that
disability discrimination was the “but for” cause of the employer’s failure to

700 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1046; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (requiring employers to treat information about an
employee obtained from “medical examinations and inquiries” “as a conﬁdential medical record”).
141 Thrivent, 700 F.3d at 1046.
142 Id. Similarly, in Hannah P. v. Coats, the Fourth Circuit held that because the employee
voluntarily disclosed her depression diagnosis to her supervisors, she could not sustain a claim
against her employer for breach of conﬁdentiality of medical information under the Rehabilitation
Act, part of her antidiscrimination claims. 916 F.3d 327, 340 (4th Cir. 2019) (“The Rehabilitation
Act does not protect information shared voluntarily.”). The court reasoned that, in fact, the
employee voluntarily shared information about her depression diagnosis with at least four of her
supervisors and admitted to such in her interrogatory responses. Id.; see also Reynolds v. Am. Nat’l
Red Cross, 701 F.3d 143, 155 (4th Cir. 2012) (ﬁnding the district court properly granted summary
judgment on a conﬁdentiality claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act because the record “clearly
show[ed]” that the appellant “disclosed his medical condition voluntarily”).
143 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 132. Anything that could reasonably justify an
employer’s reasonable belief that the person has a disability suﬃces. See id.
139
140
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hire.144 In fact, “[i]f an individual’s disability or need for reasonable
accommodation is not obvious, and s/he refuses to provide the reasonable
documentation requested by the employer, then s/he is not entitled to
reasonable accommodation.”145 Congress heard testimony from aﬀected
individuals leading up to the ADA:
[Tricia,] a bright young woman was interviewed for a position with a ﬁnancial
institution and was told that she could give notice to her present employer.
The woman who interviewed her was to call Tricia with a starting date. Tricia
decided to disclose that she had [multiple sclerosis]. Although Tricia was
initially told that it made no diﬀerence, the woman who interviewed her
failed to call with a starting date. When Tricia called to ﬁnd out what had
happened, she was told that someone else would be hired for the position.
The lady who interviewed Tricia admitted that she had been denied the job
because she had multiple sclerosis.146

Now add the conﬁdentiality provisions of the ADA that limit disclosure.
Except under narrowly prescribed circumstances, employers must collect and
maintain any information about disability—including medical records, results
of medical examinations, or medical history of the employee, and requests for
reasonable accommodations—separate from the general employee ﬁles and
treat this information “as a conﬁdential medical record.”147 There is a
disincentive for employers to request information about disability because of
its association with medical data and their fear of incurring liability under the
ADA, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), and other
privacy protections.148

144 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualiﬁed individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded . . . .”).
145 ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 132.
146 Hearing on H.R. 2273, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989 Before the Subcomm. on Select Educ.
of the Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 101st Cong. 1802-03 (1989) (statement by JoAnn L. Shanks, Chapter
Services and Equipment Coordinator, Indiana State Chapter, National Multiple Sclerosis Society).
147 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(1) (2020). Notable exceptions include: information shared with
supervisors and managers regarding restrictions and necessary accommodations on a need-to-know
basis; ﬁrst aid and safety personnel in an emergency; and government oﬃcials investigating
compliance with the employer’s responsibilities under the ADA and regulations. Id.
148 For example, one district court held that a jury could hear such evidence that an employer
breached its conﬁdentiality requirements under the ADA by asking an employee to provide a
doctor’s note after missing work. Stark v. Hartt Transp. Sys., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 3d 445, 450, 452-55
(D. Me. 2014). But see Lee v. City of Columbus, 636 F.3d 245, 255 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that such
a policy did not violate the Rehabilitation Act or the Constitution because “there is no evidence that
this inquiry is intended to reveal or necessitates revealing a disability”).
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3. Treatment of Disability Identity as Proprietary Under the Rehab Act
Third, the Department of Labor (DOL), the organization responsible for
regulating federal contractors’ compliance with Section 503149 of the
Rehabilitation Act, treats disability identity as proprietary information
belonging to the federal contractor. Section 503 and its implementing
regulations require that federal contractors take “aﬃrmative action to recruit,
hire, promote, and retain” individuals with disabilities, with a goal of
employing seven percent individuals with disabilities.150 However, the DOL
asserts that the number of people with disabilities hired by each federal
contractor (in aggregate form without personally identiﬁable information) is
not subject to public inspection.151 The DOL requires federal contractors to
maintain detailed employment records that are subject to periodic compliance
audits.152 Speciﬁcally, federal contractors are required to record:
(1) The number of applicants who self-identified as individuals with disabilities
. . . or who are otherwise known to be individuals with disabilities; (2) [t]he
total number of job openings and total number of jobs ﬁlled; (3) [t]he total
number of applicants for all jobs; (4) [t]he number of applicants with disabilities
hired; and (5) [t]he total number of applicants hired.153

If the federal government and its contractors assert that publication of the
very numbers required to assess compliance with Section 503 is exempted
from public scrutiny, then how can the public know whether contractors
comply with the applicable statutory and regulatory authority?154 This is
149 See generally Section 503, OFF. OF FED. CONT. COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB., https://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/section503.htm [https://perma.cc/G8SL-URNS].
150 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.45(a) (2019) (“[Oﬃce of Federal Contract Compliance Programs] has
established a utilization goal of 7 percent for employment of qualiﬁed individuals with disabilities
for each job group in the contractor’s workforce, or for the contractor’s entire workforce . . . .”).
151 Letter from Jane Suhr, Reg’l Dir., Oﬀ. of Fed. Cont. Compliance Programs, Pac. Reg’l Oﬀ.,
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., to Jasmine E. Harris, Professor, Univ. of Cal. Davis Sch. of L. 1 (June 19, 2019)
(on ﬁle with author) (writing in response to and describing information requested in a May 29, 2019
Harris Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request as “business conﬁdential information” subject
to the trade secret exception for FOIA requests). These claims to privacy also come after the Obama
Administration directed the DOL to establish a default of disclosure and publication. See
Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009) (“All
agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure, in order to renew their commitment to
the principles embodied in FOIA, and to usher in a new era of open Government.”); see also Jamillah
Bowman Williams, Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1684, 1688 (2019) (noting President
Obama’s guidance to the DOL).
152 29 U.S.C. § 793; 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.44(k) (2019).
153 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.44(k) (2019) (emphasis added).
154 Imagine if the Department of Education refused to publish aggregate education data on
public school compliance with federal education and special education laws on the same grounds.
Note that Vocational Rehab (VR) programs, or supported employment, explicitly require disclosure
because employers work with the VR specialist on hiring and setting up accommodations. Susan G.
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especially problematic because of Section 503’s remedial mission to address
the unemployment and underemployment of people with disabilities in the
formal economy.155
B. Procedural Law
Contrary to our tradition of public adjudication, many disability-related
proceedings unfold in informal spaces outside of public view because of a
belief that the subject matter (disability) is itself embarrassing or
stigmatizing, and that there is no public interest in disability related
proceedings.156 First, consider closed probate proceedings to appoint a
conservator and restrict an individual’s decisional autonomy. In some
jurisdictions, not only are these proceedings closed to the public, but there is
no requirement that the subject of the proceedings be physically present.157
The public interest in transparency in these cases is high given repeated
allegations of conservator abuse and overly broad grants of plenary
conservatorship. Plenary conservatorships remain the default in many
jurisdictions, eﬀectively removing all decisional authority from the
conservatee. This includes personal choices about where to live, how to
allocate ﬁnances, or with whom to associate.158 Even certain jurisdictions that
have open probate proceedings and publish probate decisions online generally

Goldberg, Mary B. Killeen & Bonnie O’Day, The Disclosure Conundrum: How People with Psychiatric
Disabilities Navigate Employment, 11 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 463, 467 (2005).
155 According to the Department of Labor, the 2019 unemployment rate of people with
disabilities was over seven percent. Oﬃce of Disability Employment Policy, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Jan.
2021), https://www.dol.gov/odep [https://perma.cc/NK49-JLXR]; see also Martha Ross and Nicole
Bateman, Only Four out of Ten Working-Age Adults with Disabilities Are Employed, BROOKINGS (July
25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2018/07/25/only-four-out-of-ten-workingage-adults-with-disabilities-are-employed [https://perma.cc/HGK6-YH8N](“Only 40 percent of
adults with disabilities in their prime working years (age 25-54) have a job, compared to 79 percent
of all prime-age adults.”)
156 See, e.g., J.W. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.R.D. 196, 200-01 (D.D.C. 2016) (concluding in
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act appeal that information about disability in the case is “a
matter of a sensitive and highly personal nature” warranting deviation from strong norms of
publicity in context of adjudication (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Waterfront Emps. v. Chao, 587 F. Supp.
2d 90, 99 (D.D.C. 2008))); see also Harris, supra note 6, at 526. While it is true that some adjudicative
spaces may be open to the public, the norm is privacy with the decision held, in theory, by the person
with a disability. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56501(c)(2) (Deering 2021) (stating that parents have
the right to decide to open special education hearings with a default of closed proceedings).
157 See, e.g., In re Mental Health of L. K., 184 P.3d 353, 360-61 (Mont. 2008) (detailing a case
in which a committee appeared from a hospital and had her microphone periodically muted during
her commitment hearing).
158 Supported
Decision Making & The Problems of Guardianship, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/disability-rights/integration-and-autonomy-peopledisabilities/supported-decision-making [https://perma.cc/B3VT-PXME].

1716

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1681

remove litigation documents that deal with conservatorship for people with
disabilities on privacy grounds.159
Second, civil commitment hearings in many jurisdictions continue to be
informal and closed to the public based on privacy concerns despite being
“quasi-criminal” in nature. Among other questions, the judge must decide
whether the person is a threat to self or others to warrant involuntary
commitment (or continued commitment) at a psychiatric hospital or other
institution. The judge reviews mental health information and hears testimony
from medical professionals, law enforcement oﬃcers (where applicable),
family, and community members. The liberty interests at stake here weigh in
favor of greater sunlight and procedural protections, not less. However,
because these proceedings are also considered therapeutic and associated with
medical treatment, courts tend to tip the scale in favor of greater privacy.
Consider, for example, a recent opinion by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court holding that civil commitment hearings held in rooms at
psychiatric hospitals did not violate due process even when the subject of
those proceedings requested that the hearing be moved to open court to allow
greater public participation.160 The lower court judge, in response to the
respondent’s request that the proceedings be moved from a conference room
in the hospital to municipal court, reminded the parties that “[t]hese
proceedings are not open to the public. They are held here in a hearing[]
room in the hospital where the public generally cannot walk into. They are
conducted generally with the patient, attorneys, family members and needed
security and medical personnel present.’”161
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, despite aﬃrming
the lower court’s ﬁnding that proceedings in the psychiatric facility did not
violate due process, had a diﬀerent view about the privacy of the hearings.
Speciﬁcally, the court found that “[a]ll civil commitment hearings, wherever
conducted, must be recorded and must operate as open, public proceedings.
These protections are critical to ensuring that civil commitment hearings
safeguard individuals’ rights to due process and equal access to the courts.”162
The court noted that the record did not contain any evidence indicating that
“members of the [general] public were prevented, or would have been
prevented, from attending the civil commitment hearing” in the psychiatric

159 Records,
SUPERIOR
CT.
OF
CAL.,
CNTY.
OF
ALAMEDA,
http://www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/Pages.aspx/Court-Records-1-#Probate
[https://perma.cc/JY3Y8NDD] (noting that probate case records are available online “except for conservatorships,
guardianships and confidential documents”).
160 In re M.C., 115 N.E.3d 546, 549 (Mass. 2019).
161 Id. at 557 n.8.
162 Id. at 549.
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hospital.163 Here, health privacy laws such as HIPAA complicate the court’s
desire to shift a well-established norm that proceedings held in hospitals are
fundamentally private.164 It is hard to imagine how the hospital would
publicize the day’s hearings and facilitate the ﬂow of public traﬃc through an
otherwise private, highly secured facility subject to medical privacy laws.
Furthermore, the actual record from these civil commitment proceedings is
not publicly available through legal databases or through public requests to
the court even in redacted form.
Third, procedural rules themselves operate at times to reinforce privacy
norms. Federal, state, and court-speciﬁc rules perpetuate the view that
disability information should be private, for example, by sealing documents
in disability cases, masking the identity of disabled litigants with initials, and
enforcing nondisclosure agreements in disability cases. These rules and
practices, particularly sealing litigation documents and entering into
nondisclosure agreements—not only protect bad actors (think Harvey
Weinstein in the context of sexual assault) but also mask the structural
problems and potential institutional remedies available. Professional
responsibility rules require lawyers to represent clients’ interests and the
client holds the waiver of conﬁdentiality.165 When defendants use
nondisclosure agreements as central points of negotiation that can make or
break a settlement, this places many civil rights lawyers in a tough position
between the needs of the individual client and the desire for promoting
broader social reforms and deterring repeat bad actors.166
C. Education Law
Voluntary disclosure of disability is often thwarted by claims that privacy
and education laws prohibit it even when the laws do not address this issue.
As a policy matter, public schools (primary and secondary) are highly risk
averse but not necessarily out of fear of violating applicable privacy laws
regulating information on disability. More often, schools use privacy laws as
a sword to enforce social norms of disability as deﬁcient and stigmatizing, or,
Id. at 557.
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 526.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
Representatives from several disability rights organizations have conveyed to me that their
impact litigation focuses on client education during pre-retention process to explain the value of
publicity as it aligns with the broader mission of the organization. Cf. Written Testimony of Debra S.
Katz, Partner and Hannah Alejandro, Senior Counsel Katz, Marshall & Banks LLP, EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/written-testimony-debra-s-katz-partner-and-hannah-alejandro-seniorcounsel-katz-marshall-banks-llp [https://perma.cc/UYD9-6HMY] (discussing how nondisclosure
agreements in the context of sexual harassment suits can be “harmful or beneﬁcial to the degree that
it respects the rights and autonomy of victims”).
163
164
165
166
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paternalistically, in the best interests of young people to protect them against
long-term risks associated with these social norms. Consider the following
example. Eva and Madeline, two high school student editors, wanted to
devote an issue of their school newspaper to the experiences of students with
depression, including their own.167 The school administration, however,
prevented publication, citing student privacy rights. Eva and Madeline
wanted to use their own and other students’ actual names, with the consent
of the students and their parents, as part of an eﬀort to normalize mental
disability among young people. The school administrators argued that
disclosure would only lead to potential bullying, in the short term, and regret
later in life168—for example, in college admissions and employment
applications—because the students would lose control over this “damaging”
information if published. Ultimately, Eva and Madeline published an opinion
piece in the New York Times and received national attention for their eﬀorts
to destigmatize mental disability.169 Even after a public outpouring of
support, however, the high school administration maintained its position
against disclosure.
What explains the school’s response to the possibility of publicity? School
administrators regulated the disclosure of disability identity by framing their
objections, in the ﬁrst instance, as a violation of privacy, designed to protect
conﬁdential medical information.170 However, this framing conﬂates
disability identity with private medical information and masks paternalistic
overreaching. Interestingly, the school’s secondary objections used privacy as
a favored prescription for disability discrimination, a way to protect the
students who identiﬁed as people with mental and psychiatric disabilities
from bullying, embarrassment, and bias, much like the arguments advanced
by some disability rights scholars. The story illustrates the ways in which
privacy regulates identity and, at times, can be misdirected to force people to
be in the closet about their disabilities. The school’s response denied the
students an opportunity for individual and collective “coming out” and the
personal (and collective) beneﬁts that publicity brings.
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), schools
have an aﬃrmative duty to locate and evaluate students with suspected
167 Madeline Halpert & Eva Rosenfeld, Opinion, Depressed, but Not Ashamed, N.Y. TIMES
(May 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/22/opinion/depressed-but-not-ashamed.html
[https://perma.cc/G9AD-6TLH].
168 Id.
169 Id.; see also, e.g., Susan Antilla, Let Teens Talk About Mental Illness, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2014/05/27/opinion/antilla-mental-illness/index.html
[https://perma.cc/7CNB-KH7S] (May 27, 2014, 9:49 AM).
170 Halpert & Rosenfeld, supra note 167; see also, e.g., Harris, supra note 6, at 526 (discussing
the application of existing privacy laws).
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disabilities who are eligible for special education services.171 Failure to
identify can occur when the school knew or should have known about a
potential disability. Like the employment context, if the student manifests
the aesthetics of disability, the school is more likely to provide legally
mandated services.
This duty must be carried out without broader disclosure and in
accordance with the educational rights holders’ (typically the parents’)
entitlement to nondisclosure of disability-related information. Thus, only
school administrators and teachers know which students who attend the
school have disabilities and this information is available only if the students
receive special education services or have a 504 plan.172 As the IDEA limits
the provision of special education services to students with a disability that
negatively aﬀects their ability to access a “free appropriate public education”
(FAPE),173 this is a much smaller percentage of the total number of students
with disabilities in public schools.
The IDEA incorporates and, at times, surpasses the protections oﬀered
by FERPA and HIPAA. All three privacy laws shroud disability in cloak of
privacy by regulating disability identity as medical diagnoses.174 The IDEA
also creates a “right to conﬁdentiality of personally identiﬁable information”
as a minimal procedural safeguard.175 Informed consent principles determine
whether the conﬁdentiality requirements have been violated.176 However, the
message from federal and state education law is clear: disclosure should be on
a “need to know basis” and solely for purposes of requesting accommodations
because disclosure opens the individual to disability discrimination.177
2o U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111 (2020).
Students with disabilities are not required to disclose their disabilities to anyone unless
they request special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) or reasonable accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As part
of the assessment process, schools obtain informed consent from the educational rights holder for
special education services and from the individual with a disability seeking accommodations.
Disability related information contained in a student’s oﬃcial education “record” is also subject to
the protections of the Family Educational Rights Protection Act (FERPA). See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §
1417(c); Catrone v. Miles, 160 P.3d 1204, 1212 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[FERPA and IDEA’s] express
statutory mandates recognize privacy interests in special education records.”).
173 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2020).
174 See 20 U.S.C. § 1417(c) (“The Secretary [of Education] shall take appropriate action . . . to
ensure the protection of the conﬁdentiality of any personally identiﬁable data, information, and
records collected or maintained by the Secretary and by State educational agencies and local
educational agencies . . . .”).
175 Id. § 1439(a)(2).
176 Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.9 (2020) (deﬁning “consent”).
177 The Oﬃce of Disability Employment Policy at the Department of Labor explains:
171
172

To whom do you disclose your disability? Generally, you should only disclose your
disability to those individuals who have a need to know because of the accommodation
process. You may consider disclosing to the program’s disability support service’s staﬀ,
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Taken to the extreme, these principles can nudge schools to be risk averse
with respect to any discussion about disability. For example, one parent
wanted to visit her child’s second grade classroom during disability awareness
month178 and discuss, alongside her son, his experience with autism. She
hoped to give the class opportunities to ask questions and move past staring
or ignoring her son’s disability altogether. The son wanted to do this. The
teacher said that the parent and son could not discuss his autism in class
because it would reveal personal medical information and would risk bullying
and other long-term discrimination. The school administration agreed with
the classroom teacher, and the mother, instead, sent a non-speciﬁc book about
autism to the school for the teacher to read to the class, losing an opportunity
for potential norm shifts and engagement on disability.
Once a young person advances to higher education, the IDEA no longer
applies (the ADA and Rehab Act apply) and any request for accommodations
looks more like the interactive process discussed above in employment
settings under Title I of the ADA.179 Given the rising numbers of students
with disabilities entering higher education, attention to accommodations is
critical.180 Interestingly, the number of students with university-approved
academic advisor, directly on your application, or to an admissions oﬃcer. Some
programs discourage students with disabilities from disclosing directly to faculty and
staﬀ because of student conﬁdentiality. It is a good idea to begin by disclosing to the
disability support services oﬃce to learn what the speciﬁc procedures are for your
program.
OFF. OF DISABILITY EMP. POL’Y, THE WHY, WHEN, WHAT, AND HOW OF DISCLOSURE IN AN
ACADEMIC
SETTING,
AFTER
HIGH
SCHOOL
(2007),
https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/76652/The_Why_When_What_and_How_of
_Disclosure_in_an_Academic_Setti.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/VS68-X4PN].
178 There is no one “disability pride” month, but all are siloed. Amanda Burris, 2020 Diversity,
Inclusion and Disability Awareness Calendar, DISABILITY SOLS. (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://www.disabilitytalent.org/single-post/2019/12/31/2020-Diversity-Inclusion-DisabilityAwareness-2020Calendar [https://perma.cc/D28R-J6LZ]. For example, October is National
Disability Employment Awareness Month, April is Autism Awareness Month, and November is
Diabetes Awareness Month. Id.
179 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,
be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 701(c)(1), (4), (5) (emphasizing principles of “respect for individual dignity, personal
responsibility, self-determination, and pursuit of meaningful careers . . . of individuals with disabilities”
and “support for involvement of an individual’s representative . . . and [the] community . . . .”).
180 People with Disabilities and Postsecondary Education—Position Paper, NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY,
https://ncd.gov/publications/2003/people-disabilities-and-postsecondary-educationposition-paper [https://perma.cc/NA3R-WDC6] (documenting rising numbers of students with
disabilities in post-secondary education); see, e.g., Susan Grimes, Jill Scevak, Erica Southgate & Rachel
Buchanan, Non-Disclosing Students with Disabilities or Learning Challenges: Characteristics and Size of a
Hidden Population, 44 AUSTRALIAN EDUC. REP. 425, 427 (2017) (“International research has attempted
to identify the true participation rates of the [students with disabilities] population and found that the
population is significantly higher than institutional statistics indicate. In one US institution,
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accommodations is inconsistent with university data on the number of
students who anonymously and voluntarily identify as students with
disabilities.181 “‘Disability’ is a stigmatised term and it is argued that few
would [publicly] choose to associate themselves with the term for this
reason.”182 Mental health, for example, is one of the fastest growing concerns
students raise and yet there is very little discussion among students
collectively and universities at the institutional level.183 Federal and state
privacy laws that treat disability identity as medical data postpone the
development of institutional designs to normalize disability and investigate
opportunities for structural reforms. Instead, university discussions often
focus on streamlining accommodations, enhancing student privacy, and
providing more individual counseling services.
D. Tort Law
Tort law continues to treat disability as a negative “private fact” that
causes reputational harm when disclosed.184 The expressive value of this legal

[researchers] reported that 8.4% of students identified as disabled although less than one percent had
disclosed to the institution.” (citing Susan L. Gabel & Maja Miskovic, Discourse and the Containment of
Disabilities in Higher Education: An Institutional Analysis, 29 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 1145 (2014))).
181 See
Students
with
Disabilities,
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
EDUC.
STAT.,
https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=60 [https://perma.cc/GMV7-QXCW] (“Nineteen
percent of undergraduates in 2015-16 reported having a disability.”). Notably, not all students with
disabilities need accommodations. Similarly, some students who need accommodations choose not to
use the formal accommodations process and prefer to work individually with professors to accommodate
them ad hoc. In these cases, privacy may not be as big of an issue, or when weighed against the time
consuming and uncertain process of formal accommodations, students choose to disclose to and directly
negotiate with the professor. Some accommodations, however, like extended time on exams, may only
be granted through the more formal accommodations process with a university’s disability center. See,
e.g.,
Alternative
Testing
Process
for
Students,
UNIV.
OF
WASH.,
https://depts.washington.edu/uwdrs/current-students/accommodations/alternative-testing
[https://perma.cc/8REK-DMYW].
182 Grimes et al., supra note 180, at 428.
183 See, e.g., College Students’ Mental Health Is a Growing Concern, Survey Finds, MONITOR ON PSYCH.,
June 2013, https://www.apa.org/monitor/2013/06/college-students [https://perma.cc/QQ9W-DEEA]
(“Ninety-five percent of college counseling center directors surveyed said the number of students with
significant psychological problems is a growing concern in their center or on campus.” (citing BRIAN J.
MISTLER, DAVID R. REETZ, BRIAN KRYLOWICZ & VICTOR BARR, THE ASSOCIATION FOR
UNIVERSITY AND COLLEGE COUNSELING CENTER DIRECTORS ANNUAL SURVEY (2012))); see also
College Students (And Their Parents) Face a Campus Mental Health ‘Epidemic,’ NPR (May 28, 2019, 2:44 PM),
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/727509438 [https://perma.cc/DZ2M-YGAE].
184 One Washington Supreme Court decision stated:
Every individual has some phases of his life and his activities and some facts about
himself that he does not expose to the public eye, but keeps entirely to himself or at
most reveals only to his family or to close personal friends. Sexual relations, . . . family
quarrels, many unpleasant or disgraceful or humiliating illnesses . . . .
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doctrine communicates to people with and without disabilities the beneﬁts of
privacy. Courts have considered publication of disability status under both
defamation and invasion of privacy branches of privacy torts.185 Public
disclosure of private facts generally requires that the fact (1) was publicized,
(2) was a private fact, (3) that is “highly oﬀensive to a reasonable person,”186
and (4) is not of “legitimate concern” to the public.187 Failure to meet any one
of these elements defeats the claim. Not only have courts repeatedly held that
“disability” is a “private fact,” but many state courts have also held that
information about disability generally meets the oﬀensiveness or
embarrassment element without the need for legal analysis.188 In Cordts v.
Cowles Publ’g Co. v. State Patrol, 748 P.2d 597 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1977)).
185 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389-407 (1960) (reviewing existing
cases on the invasion of privacy tort, organizing the cases into four categories ((1) intrusion; (2)
public disclosure of private fact; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation of the image
or likeness of the person), and discussing the elements of proof of and available defenses to each).
The Restatement, memorializing Prosser’s taxonomy, explains the elements of defamation:
To create liability for defamation there must be: (a) a false and defamatory statement
concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher [with respect to the act
of publication]; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558. Public disclosure of private facts is the publication of
the private aﬀairs of another person when the disclosures would be highly oﬀensive to a reasonable
person. See, e.g., Smith v. Methodist Hosps. of Dall., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103588, at *19 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 19, 2008) (“Publicity means that a matter is communicated to the public at large or
disseminated to so many people that it becomes public knowledge.” (citing Indus. Found. of So. v.
Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 683-84 (Tex. 1976))); see also Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.
P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 42 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing two modes of publicity: communicating
to the public and communicating to a number of individuals large enough to be deemed
communication to the public); see also Allen, Privacy Torts, supra note 37, at 1721 (analyzing privacy
tort case law in the context of LGBT plaintiﬀs and showing how plaintiﬀs often advanced legal
claims based on more than one features of Prosser’s privacy tort taxonomy).
186 See Cordts v. Chi. Tribune Co., 860 N.E. 2d 444, 450-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“An invasion
of a plaintiﬀ ’s right to privacy is important if it exposes private facts to a public whose knowledge
of those facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiﬀ.” (quoting Miller v. Motorola Inc., 560 N.E.2d
900, 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990))).
187 Taus v. Loftus, 151 P.3d 1185, 1199 (Cal. 2007) (outlining the elements of public disclosure of
private facts to include that the private fact is not of legitimate public concern). Note that it is not necessary
to prove malice unless punitive damages are sought. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 2021).
188 See, e.g., Smith at *19 (“The matter publicized must relate to the plaintiﬀ ’s private life.
There is a presumption under Texas law that the public has no legitimate interest in private,
embarrassing facts about private citizens.” (citations omitted). The court then proceeds to discuss
whether the facts rise to the level of publication without engaging the question of disability as
private. See also White v. Twp. of Winthrop, 116 P.3d 1034, 1038 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (“The
employer argues that the information disclosed [that the plaintiﬀ has epilepsy] was not highly
oﬀensive.”) Cases from other jurisdictions involving publication of the intimate details of an
employee’s medical health have met the “highly oﬀensive” requirement. See Blackwell v. Harris
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Chicago Tribune Co., for example, a plaintiﬀ claimed that an employee of his
beneﬁts evaluator wrongfully disclosed his treatment to his ex-wife.189 Cordts
asserted that the conﬁdential information disclosed (about his depression)
was of the kind that would be “highly oﬀensive to a reasonable person” and
that the disclosure was especially devastating to him due to the “special
relationship” he had with his ex-wife.190
In another case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a lower court
ruling that disclosure of a law student’s disability accommodations did not
involve a “private fact” that a reasonable person would ﬁnd “oﬀensive” if
disclosed.191 The court reasoned that the plaintiﬀ suﬃciently alleged that the
information disclosed by his law school regarding his accommodation “was
not already public knowledge.”192 The lower court’s opinion focused, in part,
on the fact that his disability was public when he failed to show up for the
ﬁnal exam with the rest of the class.193 However, his absence alone did not
constitute an explicit public disclosure and could be explained by a number
of other possible reasons. The Ninth Circuit oﬀered another reason for why
disclosure of disability accommodations met the statutory element of “private
fact” whose revelation would be “highly oﬀensive.” Speciﬁcally, the court of
appeals noted that disclosure of accommodations might reveal medical
information courts unquestionably consider “private facts,” such as medical
diagnoses, once again reaching for health privacy laws, regulations, and norms
to reduce disability identity to medical data.194
Interestingly, courts hearing claims for improper disclosure of disability
status tend to focus the least on the elements of disability as “private”
information and its “embarrassing” nature, assuming this is common
knowledge and these are established norms.195 “The right to privacy
acknowledges that the reason a person wishes to keep his or her illness
conﬁdential is to avoid the pity [or rejection] that knowledge of such a disease
Chem. N. Am., Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1310 (D. Kan. 1998) (holding alleged disclosure of personal
medical information to other employees suﬃciently met elements of private facts tort).
189 Cordts, 860 N.E.2d at 447.
190 Id.
191 Tecza v. Univ. of S.F., 532 F. App’x 667, 669 (9th Cir. 2013).
192 Id.
193 Tecza v. Univ. of S.F., 2010 WL 1838778, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2010).
194 “[T]o the extent that [the University]’s disclosure indirectly revealed some underlying
medical information—that Tecza likely had a disability and some additional information that might
allow a person to make inferences about the general nature of Tecza’s disability—California courts
have considered medical information to be a private fact.” Tecza, 532 F. App’x at 669 (citing Jeﬀrey
H. v. Imai, Tadlock & Keeney, 101 Cal. Rptr. 4th 345, 920-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)).
195 Courts primarily focus on the “publication” of the private fact and whether it is of
“legitimate concern” to the public. See, e.g., Leach v. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1334, 1339
(S.D. Fla. 2017) (focusing on the publication element of invasion of privacy and assuming without
explanation that disability is a “private fact” under state law).

1724

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1681

would engender in others.”196 However, the law is not agnostic on this front.
Failure to interrogate disability as negative, embarrassing, and pity inducing
is highly normative and norm dependent.197 It requires a conception of ablebodied as the preferred baseline such that one’s deviation from it inherently
invokes shame or pity.198
What constitutes a “private” fact under tort law is highly normative as well
as norm reinforcing.199 Courts used to treat a person’s identity as gay as
presumptively private information whose disclosure could cause
embarrassment and reputational harm. State cases from the late 1970s and
1980s illustrate how plaintiffs only had to show that one’s gay identity (and
exposure to HIV) was made public without a requisite showing of actual
damage because it was presumed harmful.200 Jenny Pizer of Lambda Legal
Defense, for example, summarized the central problem: “It shouldn’t still be
existing in the law that being gay is so horrible that when someone is falsely
accused of it they don’t have to prove that it is damaging – that the accusation
is seen as damaging on its face. People should have to prove that it’s bad.”201 If
the category or identity is not something that normatively people would find
White v. Twp. of Winthrop, 116 P.3d 1034, 1038 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publ’g Co., Inc., 253 P.2d 441, , 445 (Cal. 1953) (discussing elements
of a claim of invasion of the right of privacy including “portraying [something] to shock the ordinary
sense of decency or propriety”).This criterion is undoubtedly relative to the “customs of the time
and place, to the occupation of the plaintiﬀ and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.”
Vassiliades v. Garﬁnckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 588-89 (D.C. 1985) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977)); Harris ex rel. Harris v. Easton Publ’g
Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1384 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (dicta).
198 See, e.g., Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publ’g Co., 326 So.2d 471, 474 (Miss. 1976) (“It is
diﬃcult to conceive that any information can be more delicate or private in nature than the fact that
a child has limited mental capabilities or is in any sense mentally retarded.”).
199 Plaintiﬀs bringing tort claims against defendants for publication of a private fact without
consent, for example, must prove that the fact was “private” and one whose disclosure would be
“embarrassing to a reasonable person,” either of which might be perceived to be a concession of the
stigma and shame of the nonnormative identity. Plaintiﬀs also would make more public a fact about
sexual identity and increase the potential harm of the disclosure all in service of remedying the
“harmful” publication.
200 See Robert C. Ozer, P.C. v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Colo. 1997) (recognizing the tort
of invasion of privacy in a case involving a plaintiﬀ who was an associate at a law ﬁrm, disclosed to
the president and shareholder of the law ﬁrm that he was gay, that his partner had been diagnosed
with AIDS, and that the associate needed to get tested immediately only to be ﬁred the following
week and have this information shared with several people at the ﬁrm). However, at least one study
of the cases from the 1960s through the early 2000s shows that although gay plaintiﬀs reached for
the privacy torts seeking injunctive relief and damages, they did not achieve the anticipated success.
Allen, Privacy Torts, supra note 37, at 1723-33 (surveying the case law).
201 DAVID EHRENSTEIN, OPEN SECRET: GAY HOLLYWOOD—1928-2000, at 152 (1st perennial
ed. 2000). Jennifer C. Pizer is the Law and Policy Director for Lambda Legal, the oldest and largest
national legal organization committed to achieving full recognition of the civil rights of lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people and people living with HIV. Jennifer C. Pizer, LAMBDA LEGAL,
https://www.lambdalegal.org/about-us/staff/jennifer-c-pizer [https://perma.cc/9FLG-GDPL].
196
197
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automatically harmful or bad, the question of whether it is a “private fact”
should go to a jury. The question before the jury would be whether the nature
of the statement was such that a reasonable person hearing it would think
badly about the person of whom it was said. This inquiry is highly
contextual,202 but courts largely skipped this step, almost taking judicial notice
of the embarrassing nature of gay identity, then, and today, disability identity.
Moreover, the common law tort doctrine related to “outing” nudged
people to cover or pass as heterosexual or lose viable legal defenses.203 If a
person who identiﬁed as LGB was in a public place displaying same-sex
aﬀection, they could not later claim an invasion of privacy tort because they
publicly “chose” to put their identity on display. Even if sexual identity was
generally non-public, if it appeared in a public record, it could provide a
reasonable defense to defendants in some courts.204 Similarly, in defamation
cases, truth was an absolute defense,205 thus creating an incentive for those
who could pass as heterosexual to do just that.
IV. THE COSTS OF PRIVACY
Part IV argues that disability law’s privacy defaults and nudges have costs
that have not yet been explored and debated.206 Antidiscrimination laws have
deployed privacy as a way for individuals to hide experiences or parts of

202 See, e.g., Selleck v. Globe Int’l Inc., 212 Cal. Rptr. 838, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (providing
the facts of a case in which plaintiﬀ, father of actor Tom Selleck, brought an action against a publisher
of a tabloid magazine that allegedly quoted him about insults he allegedly made about his son’s
romantic character including that he was allegedly “ill at ease with women” and “he [is] just not the
person they [women] think he should be” (second alteration in original)).
203 See, e.g., Borquez, 940 P.2d at 377 (“The disclosure of facts that are already public will not
support a claim for invasion of privacy.” (citations omitted)).
204 See, e.g., Crumrine v. Harte-Hanks Television, Inc., 37 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App. 2001)
(aﬃrming lower court decision denying plaintiﬀ police oﬃcer’s invasion of privacy claim against
news outlet because his sexual identity was the subject of a child custody proceeding and “once true
information is disclosed in public court, there is no liability for giving publicity to that which is
already public” (citations omitted)).
205 Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy and the Changing Social Status of Homosexuality: ReThinking Supreme Court Gay Rights Jurisprudence, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 119, 122-23 (2003).
206 There are other costs to privileging privacy norms that I do not discuss in detail. For
example, privacy masks the presence of disability in society and the contributions of people with
disabilities historically. See, e.g., Sara White, Crippling the Archives: Negotiating Notions of Disability in
Appraisal and Arrangement and Description, 75 AM. ARCHIVIST 109, 120-21 (2012) (discussing the
barriers to documentation due to privacy laws and the eﬀects on knowledge creation and historical
work as a result); see also Yaron Covo, Gambling on Disability Rights, 43 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 237, 243
(2020) (arguing that the expressive value of “anti-tipping” rules in sports prohibiting the disclosure
of athletes’ psychosocial impairments may reinforce stigma associated with mental and psychosocial
impairments and obscure their prevalence among athletes).
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identity deemed normatively “bad” or embarrassing.207 But it has also become
a tool of perpetuating discrimination by masking its incidence. This Part
complicates the current discussions of privacy in the context of disability by
surfacing and unpacking the costs of our current approach.
A. Privacy Obscures Prevalence and Diversity of Disability in Society
By overvaluing privacy, we do not have an accurate picture of the breadth
of disability in society and, as a result, society limits disability to visible
markers. The aesthetics of disability in the aggregate depict the most severe
(visible) manifestations of incapacity and, as such, delineate the “deserving
disabled.”208 These markers have become probative and, in some cases,
dispositive evidence of eligibility for public beneﬁts programs like Social
Security and access to legal rights (such as standing) under disability laws.209
While not formally codiﬁed in any statute, the aesthetics of disability have
become tools of statutory and regulatory interpretation used by judges,
lawyers, and juries to decide cases.210 Notably, the aesthetic markers—
reinforced through limited media representations of disability as wheelchairs,
canes, and dark glasses211—are normative guides for civilian vigilantes to

207 Early privacy scholars skeptical of the veil of privacy such as Richard Posner argued that
privacy is actually a fraud on the market for personal reputation. Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy,
and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979) (“The market approach suggests in turn that whatever
rules governing fraud are deemed optimal in ordinary product markets ought in principle to apply
equally in labor markets, credit markets, and ‘markets’ for purely personal relationships as well.”).
Similarly, some contemporary privacy scholars actively challenge the very construction of privacy
as ﬂawed and ill-conceived, particularly considering an algorithmic-driven world. See, e.g., Kate
Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy
Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 106-09 (2014) (challenging the capacity of existing privacy frameworks
to meaningfully capture and remedy the harms of big data mining).
208 See, e.g., Doron Dorfman, Fear of the Disability Con: Perceptions of Fraud and Special Rights
Discourse, 53 LAW & SOC. REV. 1051, 1070 (2019) [hereinafter Dorfman, Fear] (“[T]he visibility of
disability plays an important role in signaling the deservingness of rights claimants. This clearly
visible deservingness has been found to have a much bigger eﬀect on the assessment for potential
disability con than the purist of self-interest and loss of personal opportunities in situations of
scarcity.” (citing Doron Dorfman, [Un]Usual Suspects: Deservingness, Scarcity, and Disability Rights, 10
UC IRVINE L. REV. 557 (2020))).
209 The ADA as promulgated by Congress in 1990 deﬁned disability as an “impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); Id. § 12132 (“[N]o
qualiﬁed individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the beneﬁts of services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”).
210 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 2, at 934-35 (discussing the impact of aesthetics of disability on
juror decisionmaking).
211 See Whitney Friedlander, How Hollywood Is Working to Improve Representation of People with
Disabilities,” CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/06/entertainment/disability-representation-inhollywood/index.html [https://perma.cc/8FQ8-7BFM] (Sept. 6, 2019, 2:54 PM) (“There’s also the
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police disability in schools, movie theaters, parking lots, airports and other
public places of accommodation.212 On the one hand, people who do not
conform and exercise their legal rights may subject themselves to harassment,
public shaming, and, in some cases, physical violence. On the other hand,
those with the visible markers who excel and surpass low expectations for
people with disabilities are perceived as exceptional, “super-crips” who have
overcome disability.213
This, in turn, leads to a false impression that the number of people with
disabilities is lower relative to other protected classes, such as women or racial
minorities when, in fact, people with disabilities represent the most populous
minority group.214 The number of people with disabilities in the United
States continues to grow with longer life expectancies and, most recently,
with the realization of the high percentage of people who will experience
long-term health impairments as a result of COVID-19.215 Though existing
data on people with less visible disabilities is scarce or criticized as
methodologically suspect,216 it is possible to extrapolate this information from
a recent data collection.217
misunderstandings and stereotypes surrounding what constitutes a person with a disability and why
their inclusion matters just as much as those of other minorities.”).
212 See Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1070 (referring to the phenomenon of public fear of
“the disability con” and importing this frame into disability law and policy); see also ELLEN
SAMUELS, FANTASIES OF IDENTIFICATION: DISABILITY, GENDER, RACE (2014). The COVID19 pandemic has exacerbated fears of fraud associated with “anti-maskers” and vaccine “line
jumpers.” See Ana Medaris Miller, ‘Anti-Maskers’ Say Medical Conditions Prevent Them from Wearing
Masks, but Doctors Say That’s Not a Legitimate Excuse; BUS. INSIDER (July 2, 2020, 7:36 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/anti-maskers-say-they-cant-wear-masks-because-medicalconditions-2020-5 [https://perma.cc/9YXG-P9RL] (describing how mask wearing has become a
political act and insincere claims of health hardships and privacy protections create public distrust);
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Opinion, Yes, It Matters That People Are Jumping the Vaccine Line, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/28/opinion/covid-vaccine-line.html
[https://perma.cc/769M-8KLU] (discussing public frustration with ineligible wealthy and politically
connected individuals who have received vaccines in exchange for political favors, donations, or social status).
213 See Sami Schalk, Reevaluating the Supercrip, 10 J. LITERARY & CULTURAL DISABILITY STUD. 71, 74
(2016) (describing the term “supercrip” as a “pejorative term for overachieving people with disabilities” that
emphasizes narratives of over “compensation for the perceived ‘lack’ created by disability”); see also Jasmine E.
Harris, Opinion, ‘The Hill We Climb’ to Overcome Stereotypes About Disabilities, S.F. CHRON. (Jan. 25, 2021, 4:00
AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/The-Hill-We-Climb-to-overcomestereotypes-15894496.php [https://perma.cc/3QZ2-54VW] (describing the “disability inspiration
porn” of Youth Poet Laureat Amanda Gorman overcoming her speech disability to perform at
President Biden’s inauguration).
214 The use of categorical identities also obscures the intersectionality of those identities, that
is, people with disabilities are also women and people of color.
215 Cf. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 10 (suggesting that the
number of people with disabilities continues to grow because life expectancy has increased).
216 Critics point to self-reporting as a central flaw of the disability data collection at the federal level.
217 Thanks to Professor Dorfman for sharing data collected in a recent study. Dorfman, Fear,
supra note 212, at 1063-64. Some of this data was used in a separate piece, however, I am taking raw
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data from his collection and extrapolating from it to estimate the percentage of people with physical
(more visible) and less apparent disabilities. Survey Sampling International (SSI) administered the
survey. With respect to its sampling, SSI recruits participants through various online communities,
social networks, and website ads. SSI makes eﬀorts to recruit hard-to-reach groups, such as ethnic
minorities and seniors. These potential participants are then screened and invited into the panel.
When deploying a particular survey, SSI randomly selects panel participants for survey invitations.
While there was no weighing of particular participants, Professor Dorfman asked SSI to recruit in
order to roughly match the census numbers of adults with disabilities (roughly 23-27% of the U.S.
population overall). See id.
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Table 1: Breakdown by Type of Disability (n=245)218

TYPES OF DISABILITY

Physical
Mental
Developmental
Learning
Chronic Illness
Sensory
Other
TOTAL

FREQUENCY

152
56
3
2
20
8
4
245

PERCENT

62.04
22.86
1.22
0.82
8.16
3.27
1.63
100.0

CUMULATIVE

62.04
84.90
86.12
86.94
95.10
98.37
100.0

The data in Table 1 above allows for an estimate of the percentage of
people with “more apparent” and “less apparent disabilities.” Of the people
who responded to the survey as having a physical disability, half reported the
use of an assistive device such as walkers, canes, prosthetic limbs, or
wheelchairs (n=76).219 Assistive devices themselves are aesthetic markers of
disability and would represent the more apparent end of the disability
continuum. The balance of people reporting physical impairments would map
closer to the nonapparent end of the continuum (n=76). The non-physical,
“other” categories of disability in Table 1 above largely fall closer to the less
apparent end of the continuum (n=93).220 Thus, a fair estimate of those with
less apparent, fewer aesthetic markers is 169 people in the data sample, which
is approximately 69% (169/245) or two-thirds of the data sample.221
The absolute number of adults with disabilities in the United States is
signiﬁcant (approximately 61 million).222 The percentage of those with less
apparent disabilities (those with few if any aesthetic markers) is
approximately two-thirds, certainly more than a majority of all who identify
as people with disabilities.223 Taken together, this is a much more nuanced
See id.
See id.
Behavioral manifestations of disabilities are not easily captured in this data set, nor are
comorbid disabilities. Still, the data here roughly reﬂect broader estimates of non-apparent
disabilities in society. The data also illustrate the ﬂaws of current data collection and the need for
more formal, consistent data collection, especially longitudinal, disaggregated data.
221 Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1067 (“[I]t is fair to assume that the less visible the
disability, the more likely it is suspected as fake. It is unsurprising that, of the narratives about
situations in which respondents felt suspected of faking disability, 42% (43 out of 102) mentioned
having ‘nonapparent’ disabilities or ‘not looking sick/disabled.’”).
222 Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC: 1 in 4 US Adults Live with
a Disability (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2018/p0816-disability.html
[https://perma.cc/W7ZE-AFUF].
223 See supra note 217.
218
219
220
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and robust picture of people with disabilities that underscores the
imperceptibility of disability in society. People with disabilities, like those of
any identity group, may have diﬀerent capabilities, but privacy norms that
nudge people with less visible disabilities to cover or pass mask the sheer
numbers of people with disabilities living their lives each day in public spaces.
Thus, privacy norms prevent the development of a nuanced picture of
people with disabilities along a continuum and, instead, maintain a social norm
of disability as severe, obvious, and visible. This affects not only the relationships
between people with and without disabilities but also horizontal relationships
between those with and without aesthetic markers. If the norm was a continuum
rather than a binary, people might feel less entitled to police what are understood
as “special benefits” for a minority group. This includes actions by people with
more apparent disabilities who question the legitimacy of claims to disability
identity (and the resources that may come with such identification) by those
without visible markers of disability.224 This distorted view, in turn, prevents
broader sociopolitical organizing around disability identity.
B. Ambiguity Aversion
Privacy norms also may push discrimination underground. Speciﬁcally,
privacy nudges in disability antidiscrimination and other laws may work
counterintuitively to make people with disabilities more susceptible to bias
in some settings. Consider the hiring process in the employment setting.
Professors Joni Hersch and Jennifer Shinall’s work on “ambiguity aversion”—
that individuals prefer known risks over unknown risks225—oﬀers insights
about the cost of privacy in employment in the context of family status that
extend analytically to disability status.226 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and related regulations prohibit prospective employers from asking questions
about marital status, and number and ages of children only of women and not
men, or only of men and not women seeking employment, with the goal of
mitigating sex discrimination.227
Professors Hersch and Shinall’s empirical study asked whether
nondisclosure or active concealment of personal information lowers female

224 See JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL
SAFETY NET 16 (2006) (discussing how people with more visible disabilities are perceived as more
deserving of beneﬁts).
225 While the theory of ambiguity aversion is considered irrational in behavioral economics, it
is still widely regarded as predictive. See generally Hersch & Shinall, supra note 90. Hersch and
Shinall’s project is clear that the employer does not face ambiguity aversion when interviewing a
male candidate because the caregiver work is assumed to be done by women. Id. at 56.
226 Id. at 52.
227 Id.
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applicants’ hiring prospects.228 They concluded, counterintuitively, that
workplace information restrictions “may actually serve to stiﬂe, rather than
improve, workplace equity” between men and women.229 They found that
otherwise identical applicants with a substantial gap in their work history
(namely, college-educated women in their forties) who do not explain
personal family circumstances surrounding their job search are far less likely
to be hired than those who do disclose, regardless of the content of the reason
provided.230 Workplace information restrictions in this context result in
employers refraining from asking such questions, and employment applicants
similarly refraining from oﬀering this information.231 The expressive value of
law and perceptions that questions of disability, like questions of parental or
family status are oﬀ-limits, creates a taboo space where parties on both sides
feel constrained—the employer, not to ask questions, and the employee, not
to give any information in those areas. Similar to the family status context,
neither prospective hires nor existing employees are prohibited from
discussing their disabilities or claiming a disability identity, however, the fact
that employers may not ask questions pre-oﬀer about disability nudges both
employer and prospective employee to steer clear of disability discussions not
only as taboo but also as illegal.
Consider how ambiguity aversion operates in the employment context for
two people with disabilities—Natalia, who has multiple sclerosis and uses a
cane as an assistive device, and Jenny, who has a chronic illness, ﬁbromyalgia,
but no external aesthetic markers of disability. Both candidates have a gap in
their resumes of roughly one year that goes unexplained in any of the
application documents. Both women have comparable qualiﬁcations and
credentials on paper. A data management company interviews both women
for an open position. Neither has requested reasonable accommodations for
the interview and their resumes have no information that could identify them
as people with disabilities.
Title I of the ADA, like Title VII after which it was modeled, provides
preemployment protections for both job candidates. An employer “shall not
conduct a medical examination or make inquiries of a job applicant as to
whether such applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or
severity of such disability.”232 For Natalia, whose cane is an aesthetic marker,
Id. at 49.
Id. at 55. “To investigate whether concealing family information actually improves women’s
employment prospects, we conducted an original experimental study ﬁelded on more than 3000
subjects.” Id. at 49.
230 Id. at 55, 72.
231 Id. at 54.
232 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2)(A). The employer is prohibited from asking questions about
general health, past medical history, time oﬀ for health reasons, or the applicant’s worker’s
228
229
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the challenge is not whether to disclose to the employer but when to do so
(before, on the day of, or after an interview). She may need to disclose her
disability before the interview if she needs to request reasonable
accommodations—e.g., the company’s oﬃce in New York is on the tenth ﬂoor
with no elevator. Natalia might request the interview be held somewhere else
or virtually. If she waits to disclose, not only might she trigger the
interviewer’s sensory or behavioral responses to disability aesthetics in real
time, but the employer may also experience resentment, albeit unjustly,
because the information was not shared previously, all of which could aﬀect
Natalia’s chances being hired.233 Because of restrictions on preemployment
inquiries, the employer-interviewer will encounter the aesthetics of disability
but will be unable to ask questions about it and, thus, experience ambiguity
aversion with respect to future costs or work productivity.234
Although the experience may diﬀer somewhat for Jenny, the same
ambiguity aversion exists for the employer. For Jenny, assuming no reasonable
accommodation was requested for the interview, the choice is whether to
disclose at all (at the interview, post-oﬀer if hired, or on the job) or pass as
nondisabled which would require her to self-accommodate. When her
ﬁbromyalgia is active, without accommodations, she may need to create
excuses why she cannot be at work or must work remotely. Although Jenny
does not manifest readily apparent aesthetic markers, her gap year raises
questions about either her family status or disability, each heightening the
ambiguity aversion experienced by the employer-interviewer. Employers also
have concerns about applicants with invisible disabilities who they will hire
and may feel trapped to accommodate because of antidiscrimination laws.
The reality of low to de minimus accommodation costs is not widely
understood even among human resources professionals or corporate
compliance oﬃcers.235 This, combined with ambiguity aversion may explain
compensation history. Employers are allowed to administer examinations after an oﬀer of
employment has been made but before the person begins her employment under certain conditions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); e.g., id. § 12113(e) (listing conditions, such as when someone has an
infectious disease).
233 See, e.g., Melanie Whetzel, If We Had Known . . ., JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK (Nov.
28, 2018), https://askjan.org/blogs/jan/2018/11/if-we-had-known.cfm [https://perma.cc/Z67RYKEX] (“Many employers expect job applicants to disclose their disabilities during the
application/interview stage and feel deceived when they ﬁnd out later on that an employee had a
disability at the time of the hiring, but neglected to let the employer know. Some employers even
go as far as to say if they had known about a disability, they wouldn’t have hired the employee.”).
234 Covering may also be an option, i.e., not actively hiding identity but also not ﬂaunting or
performing a stereotypical version of it. See Yoshino, supra note 15, at 837.
235 D.J. Hendricks, Linda C. Batiste & Anne Hirsh, Cost and Effectiveness of Accommodations in the
Workplace: Preliminary Results of a Nationwide Study, DISABILITY STUD. Q., Fall 2005, https://dsqsds.org/article/view/623/800 [https://perma.cc/PDF2-KYBG] (reporting on Job Accommodation
Network data and finding that the median accommodation cost to an employer is $250); see, e.g., H.
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why employment rates for people with disabilities actually fell after Congress
passed the ADA in 1990.236
C. Privatizes the Costs of Disability
The continued reliance on faulty social norms of disability in
decisionmaking have led organizations devoted to increasing opportunities
for people with disabilities to discourage disclosure, particularly in
employment during the hiring process.237 For example, consider a job
candidate, Zuri, a person with a less apparent disability. She discloses her
disability on employment applications over the course of four years and never
receives a call back. As a result, Zuri believes that her disclosure must have
deterred prospective employers, particularly because she either easily meets
or exceeds the listed job qualiﬁcations. After consulting with the Job
Accommodation Network (JAN),238 a federally funded contractor, Zuri
decides not to disclose her disability.239
Zuri’s decision to omit reference to her disability in the hiring process,
and, potentially, in the workplace at all, illustrates a third category of costs
of overvaluing privacy norms: privatizing the costs of disability. Rather
than exercise one’s rights in the workplace, for example, people with
disabilities are opting out of exercising their rights or underaccommodating
to downplay disability.240 Without disclosure, an employer has no legal
obligation to accommodate those with nonobvious disabilities.241

Stephen Kaye, Lita H. Jans & Erica C. Jones, Why Don’t Employers Hire and Retain Workers with Disabilities?,
21 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 526, 533-34 (2011) (citing several studies finding “that the typical individual
accommodation is inexpensive and more than pays for itself in increased productivity”).
236 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 276 (2000)
(“[E]mployment levels fell signiﬁcantly for disabled workers aged 21-39 relative to nondisabled
workers in this same age cohort.” (citing Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Angrist, Consequences of
Employment Protection? The Case the Americans with Disabilities Act 12-13 (Working Paper 1999))).
237 See Whetzel, supra note 233 (“If no accommodation is needed for the application or the
interview process, you might seriously consider postponing the disclosure conversation until after
you get a job oﬀer.”).
238 JAN is funded by the U.S. Department of Labor and the Oﬃce of Disability Employment
Policy. About JAN, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK, https://askjan.org/about-us/index.cfm
[https://perma.cc/4KNQ-7V9U].
239 This hypothetical is based on an example found in Whetzel, supra note 233.
240 David C. Baldridge & John F. Veiga, Toward a Greater Understanding of the Willingness to
Request an Accommodation: Can Requesters’ Beliefs Disable the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 26 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 85, 85 (2001) (“[U]nderaccommodation continues to be a major barrier to equal
employment opportunities for people with disabilities.” (citing DAVID BRADDOCK & LYNN
BACHELDER, THE GLASS CEILING AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (1994))).
241 See, e.g., Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., 93 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir. 1996) (ﬁnding for the
employer because the plaintiﬀ failed to disclose to the employer “any limitations resulting from his
disability, and . . . any need for a reasonable accommodation”), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1029 (1996).
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Thus, the ADA creates what disability scholars have dubbed “the
Goldilocks dilemma” or the “double bind,” where the person with a disability
has to show both the existence of an impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities and, at the same time, that she is qualified to
perform the essential functions of a job.242 This places people with disabilities
in an awkward position where “successfully performing as a worker, seem[s]
to cast doubt on one’s disability, and vice versa,” requiring that they choose
among two opposite normative performances.243 As a result, not only are the
costs placed on the individual to assimilate, but privacy does nothing to
populate the continuum of disability and challenge the legitimate/illegitimate
binary. This creates an environment where “workers often struggle to
conform to some imagined ideal of disability by downplaying or hiding their
disability; or, by giving the impression that they are overcoming their
disability through hard work and determination.”244 It also establishes an
expectation that this is possible, desired, or the gold standard. Thus, “many
workers view their ADA rights through the perspective of their coworkers;
imagining how they are judged, accepted, or rejected as workers. For this
reason, workers perform and adopt an attitude that downplays the eﬀects of
their disability and avoids relying too heavily on the ADA.”245
One study, based on qualitative interviews with workers with disabilities,
captures the ways in which suspicions and public policing (and even the
thought of exposure to it) alters workers’ behavior. For one employee who
fell and injured her ankle, her supervisor’s suspicion and disbelief about her
disability pushed her to contemplate ﬁnding a new job rather than exercise
her rights to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA.246 The study
illustrates the extent to which some employees with disabilities will go to
“hide their disability, its impact on their bodies, or any visual reference to
it.”247 Individuals with disabilities exist in siloes in the workplace with strong
privacy norms. Those with the aesthetics of disability focus on either
downplaying the disability or exaggerating the visible impairment to secure
242 Areheart, supra note 74, at 181, 185-87. The ADA as promulgated by Congress in 1990 defined
disability as an “impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Paul R. Durlak, Making Rights in the Workplace: Workers’
Perceptions of the Americans with Disabilities Act 19 (May 14, 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Buffalo, State University of New York) (on file with author) (“This dilemma frames the
performance and outward appearance of disability as a seemingly contradictory thing: disabled, yet
also able to work. As a result, many scholars accused the courts of maintaining an almost impossible
standing for people with a disability seeking protection from the law.” (citations omitted)).
243 Durlak, supra note 242, at 19.
244 Id. at 21.
245 Id. at 30; see also Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1067-68 (discussing experiences with and
fear of disability suspicion among people with invisible and visible disabilities).
246 Durlak, supra note 242, at 31-32.
247 Id. at 32.
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a place among the “deserving disabled” and exercise rights to
accommodations.248 At the other end of the continuum, people without the
aesthetic markers seek to pass as nondisabled so as to not make waves even if
it means forgoing legal rights. This approach may also place the disabled
employee in a more precarious situation where nondisclosure means the
person cannot access a needed accommodation to perform the essential
functions of the position and, thus, become more susceptible to a negative
employment action.249
In either case, privacy norms transfer the costs of accommodations to
employees. This not only exacerbates the emotional and physical labor
associated with performing disability, but also ﬁnancially burdens employees
rather than the employer or institution. People with disabilities experience a
“disability tax,” the extra costs of daily living, such as additional medical
expenses, personal assistance, retroﬁtting spaces for accessibility, food,
clothing, or other personal care items. One study suggests that living with a
disability may cost an additional estimated $1000 to $7000 per year, which,
over time, becomes a considerable ﬁnancial burden on households.250
This is particularly egregious when taking an employers’ costs into
consideration. Research suggests that provision of reasonable accommodations
costs most employers nothing and, when there is a cost, the typical
expenditure to the employer is de minimis.251 Interestingly, the employers
surveyed in one study reported that they gain several advantages that greatly
outweigh the costs, including direct benefits such as retention of employees,
avoiding the costs of onboarding new employees, increased productivity,
increased attendance, and greater diversity.252 Indirect benefits noted by
employers include improved interactions between co-workers and increased

248 Dorfman, Fear, supra note 212, at 1070 (discussing the role of disability visibility in
“signaling the deservingness” of people with disabilities).
249 The design of disability antidiscrimination law here encourages disabled employees to
“lead[]” with their value first and then, only if needed, disclose a disability. Rachel Casper,
Transitioning Reasonable Accommodations from Law School to the Workplace, LAWS. CONCERNED FOR
LAWS. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.lclma.org/2020/01/30/transitioning-reasonable-accommodationsfrom-law-school-to-the-workplace-bba-event-on-february-3 [https://perma.cc/U34V-85YG].
250 Sophie Mitra, Daniel Mont, Hoolda Kim, Michael Palmer & Nora Groce, The Hidden Extra Costs
of Living with A Disability, CONVERSATION (July 25, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://theconversation.com/the-hiddenextra-costs-of-living-with-a-disability-78001 [https://perma.cc/S7Q8-WRH3].
251 JOB ACCOMODATION NETWORK, WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: LOW COST, HIGH
IMPACT
2
(2020),
https://askjan.org/publications/TopicDownloads.cfm?pubid=962628&action=download&pubtype=pdf [https://perma.cc/Y588-MWQ2].
252 Id. at 2,4.

1736

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 169: 1681

company morale.253 Moreover, employers can use certain state and federal tax
benefits to offset the costs of providing reasonable accommodations.254
Finally, when individual employees absorb the costs of accommodation, this
relieves pressure for public entities to change structures, practices, and policies
that presume “typical” bodies and minds. Consider corporate diversity, equity,
and inclusion (DEI) efforts: while ninety percent of companies claim to invest
in and value diversity, only four percent include disability as part of their DEI
efforts.255 Nevertheless, the case for disability as diversity exists not only as a
potential customer base but also with respect to corporate social responsibility
and best practices for employee hiring and retention.256 Companies such as
Virgin Media have set hiring goals much like those under Section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act to increase the number of employees with disabilities at their
organizations, in part, by paying attention to the ways that disability biases
infect hiring and may weed out qualified applicants.257
To the extent that corporations advance disability as a part of DEI, and
even set hiring goals, DEI data is often kept confidential even in the aggregate
(with no personally identifying information). As a result, companies are not
held accountable for their inclusion initiatives. Even more troubling, under
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act where federal contractors have a duty to
design and implement affirmative action and produce data to show
compliance, both the contactors and government agencies have claimed, for
example, that this information is proprietary to the contracting organization
and thus not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests.258
V. THE VALUE OF PUBLICITY
Part V takes up the natural question of how to address the negative privacy
costs discussed in Part IV. First, I introduce the value of publicity, in part, by
oﬀering a more nuanced framing of privacy to include the collective interests
in disability identity. Second, I explain how and why publicity plays a starring
role in contemporary social movements such as #MeToo and Dreamers.

Id. at 4.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 44(c) (detailing tax beneﬁts for small businesses for architectural changes,
equipment, or services); id. § 190 (detailing tax beneﬁts for businesses of any size that make
architectural and transportation modiﬁcations).
255 Caroline Casey, Do Your D&I Efforts Include People with Disabilities?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/do-your-di-efforts-include-people-with-disabilities
[https://perma.cc/N6HM-8QG9].
256 Id.
257 See id.
258 See supra note 151. This is a disturbing trend happening also in other spaces. See, e.g.,
Bowman, supra note 151, at 1690 (discussing the use of trade secret arguments to control information
in litigation and noncompete agreement contexts).
253
254
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Finally, I oﬀer three concrete steps we can take to recalibrate: disability data,
law reform, and strategic nudges to incentivize publicity of disability identity.
A. Theoretical Re-Framing of the Interests/Stakes
Privacy conceptions that focus solely on the individual are insuﬃcient to
capture the varied interests at play in disability antidiscrimination law.
Outside of disability law, several privacy law scholars have moved away from
a narrow framing of privacy as purely an individual right to selfdetermination by recognizing public interests at stake in the production and
circulation of information. These discussions among scholars can help us
better understand why some degree of privacy must exist in the context of
disability identity and status but, perhaps most relevant to the disability
space, why privacy is not absolute nor simply a matter of individual choice.
For example, in addition to baseline constitutional arguments in favor of
privacy under the First and Fourth Amendments,259 Pricilla Regan argues
that while privacy is valuable for the individual, it also is critical for society.
All, or at least the vast majority of, individuals value some degree of privacy
(of information, home, or body), and this privacy is essential for both
individual and social existence.260
First, Professor Regan contends that privacy is eﬀectively a “collective or
public good, as used in economics” because both technology and market
forces make it more diﬃcult for any one person to have privacy without all
persons having a similar minimum level of privacy.261 Because technology and
automation require some disclosure to allow the individual to participate in
society—receive health care, apply for employment, maintain a bank account,
attain a mortgage, etc.—it is not realistic to think that the individual could
exit the market completely. If an individual did go “oﬀ the grid,” accessing
goods and services for the individual would be more diﬃcult and the
imbalance would make the market more ineﬃcient.262 Second, some level of
privacy is fundamental to the development of commonality—namely, our
democratic political system and process.263 People can express divergent
political opinions and construct individual identities vis-à-vis the body
politic; as a result, privacy itself is intrinsically linked to publicity and
259 Specifically, the First Amendment right entails freedom of speech and the Fourth Amendment
right protects against unwanted government intrusion.
260 See supra Section I.A.
261 Priscilla Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy, in THE
HANDBOOK OF PRIVACY STUDIES, supra note 44, at 57, 57-61 (citation omitted).
262 Id. at 59.
263 Id.; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1610-11 (1999) (arguing that privacy protections are important to protect individuals seeking to
explore and understand their identities and discuss those identities with others online).
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deﬁning what is public because it ensures that people are not “overdiﬀerentiated,” an important point in the context of disability.264
We have a conception of privacy that is not absolute. Most notable
exceptions to personal control and strong privacy as the basis for autonomy
are rooted in public safety or health where an individual’s rights to the
information or the decision may be trumped if the public value is strong
enough, as we have experienced during COVID-19. Everything from
HIV/AIDS and partner notification, respecting personal privacy may run
counter to the well-being of others (biological relatives for certain types of
genetic risk or sexual partners in the case of STIs). While there are strict edicts
about the need to protect privacy in the medical sphere, well-recognized
exceptions exist and continue to emerge when nondisclosure is likely to result
in harm to others. This is baked into professional responsibility duties and
ethics such as the exception to the requirement that lawyers keep their clients’
secrets, including in an ongoing investigation where the crime has not been
solved.265 The rules say that the lawyer “may” disclose if the public interest is
strong enough, and the threat must be “imminent[].”266
Thus, the question is not limited to privacy or publicity, disclosure or
nondisclosure. Rather, discussions about privacy in the context of disability
should be malleable and are highly contextual. This Article oﬀers principles
or criteria that should be used in designing disability antidiscrimination
interventions to allow for a robust accounting of the stakes of disclosure and
the relevant stakeholders. The next subsection deﬁnes “publicity” and oﬀers
places where strategic nudges in disability law and policy can introduce
publicity values into the privacy debates. Rather than the opposite of privacy,
publicity is intrinsically connected to it.267
B. Publicity Values in Social Movements
“Publicity” here means a strategic communications approach to
systematically change problematic social norms. Publicity requires that public
and private institutions create spaces for individuals with less apparent
disabilities to claim disability as a sociopolitical identity while paying
attention to individual interests in privacy. Unlike existing privacy norms in
264 Regan, supra note 261, at 59 (quoting PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY:
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 226-27 (1995)). For example, if a social
media platform extracts data to deliver targeted political messages, the democratic process, writ
large, would be harmed, hence the broader public interests at stake.
265 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) cmt. ¶¶ 7-8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
266 Id. ¶ 6.
267 See, e.g., JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED
FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 30 (2018) (“The creation of a right of publicity and its divergence from the
right of privacy were not driven by essential diﬀerences.”).
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disability law that place the onus on the individual to control and protect her
interests in disability status and identity, the introduction of publicity
recognizes the remedial role institutional actors must play. Just as privacy
scholars tout the collective value of privacy for democratic participation,
publicity values oﬀer key organizing principles for the development of
disability as a sociopolitical identity.268 Publicity, therefore, refers to more
than individuals with less apparent disabilities “coming out” as disabled.269
Individual decisions to conceal disability identity or status, where
possible, respond to structural-level social stigma; however, concealment does
nothing to change the problematic structures themselves.270 Similarly, while
coming out as a person with a disability has the potential for individual and,
in the aggregate, group movement-building, this alone is insuﬃcient to solve
the structural problem of institutionalized ableism and neurotypicality that is
so pervasive in society.
Three critical features link contemporary movements such as the
Dreamers (undocumented Americans) and #MeToo (survivors of sexual
violence and harassment) with the early LGB movement in the 1970s and
1980s and the evolving disability rights movement.271 First, and most
prominently, publicity is at the core of the movement. In fact, these
movements appropriate the master schema of the “closet” and “coming out”
not because it is a perfect metaphor, rather, because it is a well-known one that
can generate broader support.272 Although, retrospectively, some sexuality
scholars have questioned the utility of the “closet” metaphor for the gay rights
Jodi Dean, Publicity’s Secret, 29 POL. THEORY 624, 624-25 (2001).
The closet as a metaphor and foil to coming out have been critiqued by scholars such as
Judith Butler and Eve Sedgwick for its reliance on binary oversimpliﬁcation. Danielle Bobker,
Coming Out: Closet Rhetoric and Media Publics, 5 HIST. PRESENT 31, 34 (2015). Michael Warner’s
work, for example, critiques the mantra “the personal is political”—that is, that issues of personal
identity provide an ideal focus for political action—as dangerously reinforcing the individual as the
subject and one that is solely responsible for their invisibility. MICHAEL WARNER, PUBLICS AND
COUNTERPUBLICS 52 (2002).
270 See Michael H. Pasek, Gabrielle Filip-Crawford, & Jonathan Cook, Identity Concealment and
Social Change: Balancing Advocacy Goals Against Individual Needs, 73 J. SOC. ISSUES 397, 398 (2017).
271 The ﬁrst generation included the grassroots organizers and protestors such as Judith
Heumann, Ed Roberts, and Justin Dart. See generally FRED PELKA, WHAT WE HAVE DONE: AN
ORAL HISTORY OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 183-226 (2012); JUDITH HEUMANN &
KRISTEN JOINER, BEING HEUMANN: AN UNREPENTANT MEMOIR OF A DISABILITY RIGHTS
ADVOCATE (2020). There are a number of disability rights priorities today that were not a part of
the early movement, for example, understanding how race and class intersect with movement leaders
and priorities. See, e.g., Letter from Disability Rts. Laws. & Activists to the Steering Comm.,
tenBroek Disability L. Symp., Nat’l Fed’n for the Blind (Apr. 5, 2019) (on ﬁle with author)
(highlighting the lack of diversity among the movement’s leaders and the need to contend with race
and transphobia within the disability legal community).
272 This is the subject of a working book manuscript on the role of publicity in social
movements and will not be built out in this piece.
268
269
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movement and thus, its applicability to other movements,273 other social
movement scholars note the transposability of the metaphor as its legacy:
Coming out was, for the first time, set up in explicit relation to the metaphor
of the closet. A hostile, homophobic mainstream culture was blamed for the
creation of the closet but individuals, including gay individuals, were blamed
for its maintenance. Thus, the mantra “Come Out, Come Out, Wherever
You Are” of the 1980s and 1990s can be understood as just as much of a demand
for gays and lesbians to publicly declare their sexuality as an assurance of safety and
community. This new formulation of coming out asserts “the public relevance
of what others deem private.”274

Second, the movements organized around, at least in part, the ways in
which laws and regulations contributed to their marginalization by forcing
them to “hide in the shadows.” For example, in the gay rights context,
Professor Kenji Yoshino has argued that laws forced sociopolitical invisibility,
such as “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”.275 Social action and calls from Harvey Milk
to come out of the closet forged a movement that led to legal victories and
legislative victories such as the death of anti-sodomy laws targeting the gay
community.276 Survivors of sexual violence organized the #MeToo movement
273 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 958 (1989) (arguing that LGB individuals “would rather
switch than ﬁght” if they are able to blend in with their heteronormative counterparts, limiting the
LGB movement).
274 Abigail C. Saguy & Anna Ward, Coming Out as Fat: Rethinking Stigma, 74 SOC. PSYCH. Q.
53, 59 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting JOSHUA GAMSON, FREAKS TALK BACK:
TABLOID TALK SHOWS AND SEXUAL NONCONFORMITY 200 (1998)).
275 Yoshino, supra note 15, at 778; see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., to
John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Reps., Letter from the Attorney General to Congress on
Litigation
Involving
the
Defense
of
Marriage
Act
(Feb.
23,
2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/letter-attorney-general-congress-litigation-involving-defensemarriage-act [https://perma.cc/7BVM-3YAB] (“[A] growing scientiﬁc consensus accepts that sexual
orientation is a characteristic that is immutable; it is undoubtedly unfair to require sexual orientation
to be hidden from view to avoid discrimination.” (citations omitted)).
276 In one of Milk’s more famous speeches about the ideal of equality, he professed:

Gay people, we will not win our rights by staying quietly in our closets. . . . We are
coming out to ﬁght the lies, the myths, the distortions. We are coming out to tell the
truths about gays, for I am tired of the conspiracy of silence, so I’m going to talk about
it. And I want you to talk about it. You must come out.
The
Official
HARVEY
MILK
Biography,
MILKFOUNDATION.ORG,
https://milkfoundation.org/about/harvey-milk-biography [https://perma.cc/W7D4-WSZT]. Dan White, also
a member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, assassinated Harvey Milk and San Francisco Mayor
George Moscone on November 27, 1978. White vehemently opposed a city antidiscrimination ordinance
introduced to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination in employment, public services, and places of
public accommodations. Les Ledbetter, Bill on Homosexual Rights Advances in San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
22,
1978),
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1978/03/22/110810981.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0
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in response to the inability of law to provide protection or justice for
survivors. This included a frontal attack on the use of nondisclosure
agreements in private settlements with survivors that obscured real structural
issues around power and sexual violence.277 Moreover, advocates are calling
for Congress to introduce bills that restrict the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements in harassment disputes and require employers to disclose
harassment claims.278
Similarly, the Dreamers organized around moving “out of the shadows”
where punitive immigration law and policies forced undocumented
immigrants to hide or face deportation.279 Professor Rose Cuison Villazor, for
example, explains that “[t]o lessen the chances of deportation [undocumented
immigrants] live in society in largely unnoticed ways and avoid calling
attention to their very existence, despite the burdens of living concealed
lives.”280 In addition to the threat of or actual deportation, undocumented
immigrants face legal obstacles in a variety of other circumstances pertaining
to detention, re-entry, and employment. For example, undocumented
immigrants can be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the
individual is to be removed from the United States.281 If an undocumented
immigrant is removed from the United States, that individual will likely face
barriers to re-entry.282 Both despite and because of these barriers for
undocumented immigrants, many undocumented immigrants have revealed
their undocumented status as they “seek to acquire recognition of their
existence from society” and change the “shadow” narrative.283 Professor

[https://perma.cc/7K6Y-TQXF]. In fact, Dan White “feared” that his constituents would “move out of the city
or ‘react punitively,’” in statements later used as evidence of his animus toward gay men, including Harvey
Milk. Tim Fitzsimons, Forty Years After His Death, Harvey Milk’s Legacy Still Lives On, NBC NEWS (Nov. 27,
2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/forty-years-after-his-death-harvey-milk-s-legacystill-n940356 [https://perma.cc/TE2U-BTRM] (quoting Ledbetter, supra).
277 Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual
Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 858, 866-70 (2019).
278 See Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV.
229, 235 (2018) (describing the current state and federal laws legislators are considering that restrict
the use of mandatory arbitration agreements).
279 See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, The Undocumented Closet, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (2013) (drawing
from the “coming out” metaphor to describe how undocumented individuals go through a version
of this when they reveal their immigration status).
280 Id. at 29.
281 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested
and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.”).
282 See id. § 1182(a)(9) (stating provisions for excluding undocumented individuals who were
previously removed from the United States).
283 Cuison Villazor, supra note 279, at 29, 52.
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Cuison Villazor suggests that the change in social narrative may prompt a
change in the law,284 a common thread connecting these social movements.
In this respect, the disability rights movement parts ways with its
contemporaries. Neither the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 nor the Americans
with Disabilities Act came about as a result of a highly publicized and
contested social movement. This is not to say that disability rights advocates
did not contribute to the promulgation of these disability antidiscrimination
laws; their legacies are clear. Rather, when we think about the major social
movements of the twentieth and twenty-ﬁrst centuries such as civil rights
movements for racial and gender equality, or the gay rights movement,
publicity was a major part of the strategy to gain access to rights. There were
relatively fewer nationally televised protests (perhaps other than the
occupation of the HEW oﬃce in San Francisco to force HEW Secretary
Califano to issue regulations for the Rehabilitation Act of 1973),285 there was
no publicly visible mass political or social contestation that produced the
ADA similar to that which produced the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In fact,
legislative advocates involved with the ADA’s promulgation explicitly relied
on public inattention to the ADA which allowed it to pass without the
common partisan negotiations and in-ﬁghting. The next subsection oﬀers
initial prescriptions—both legal and policy reforms—that emphasize the role
of institutions and not just individuals in advancing publicity values to shift
social norms of disability.
C. The Prescriptive Path Ahead
The primary contribution of this Article is to challenge an assumption in
disability law that privacy best serves antidiscrimination eﬀorts. The
operative prescription or set of prescriptions must ask how we make disability
more visible; not how do we hide it better. We want to ﬁnd a way to best
incentivize publicity and visibility while mitigating or eliminating its costs.
The recalibration of privacy and publicity values in disability law is a
massive, long-term project. However, I oﬀer a few initial prescriptions in

284 See id. at 61 (explaining how the Dreamers’ coming out movement has pushed for more
favorable immigration policies, including President Barack Obama instituting the Deferred Action
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program).
285 Other publicized protests include the 1990 Capitol Crawl and the “Deaf President Now” protest
by deaf students at Gallaudet University. Becky Little, When the ‘Capitol Crawl’ Dramatized the Need for
Americans with Disabilities Act, HISTORY (July 24, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/americans-withdisabilities-act-1990-capitol-crawl [https://perma.cc/L9W4-XM4C] (“Though reporters and photographers
covered the Capitol Crawl . . . it didn’t receive a huge amount of media attention at the time.”). See generally
JOHN B. CHRISTIANSEN & SHARON N. BARNARTT, DEAF PRESIDENT NOW!: THE 1988 REVOLUTION
AT GALLAUDET UNIVERSITY (1995).
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service of reframing the current conversations. On the front end, data
collection and institutional subsidies can help advance visibility.
1. Disability Data
We need to understand the scope and diversity of disability in society to
populate a disability continuum advanced in this Article. Similarly, we need to
track investment in disability rights laws, policies, and interventions, and, more
broadly, to understand the impact of laws and policies on people with
disabilities. Thus, we need to create a structure for disclosure and data gathering
that does not only go to diversity departments at universities or human resources
departments in the private sector, but also has greater public value.
This Article identiﬁed the absence of reliable data on disability in public
circulation and attributed this to the construction of disability identity as
private. Federal and state governments do collect information on disability,286
however, these data collections are not designed to track and meaningfully
measure disability identity. The three main federal disability surveys ask
about the same six disability categories of impairment: hearing, vision,
cognitive, ambulatory, self-care, and independent living.287
The U.S. Census tracks demographic information on race and ethnicity,
but it does not include disability in its main data reporting.288 Instead, the
American Community Survey (ACS), a project of the U.S. Census, does
gather disability data based on functional impairments tied to daily living. The
ACS replaced the Census “long-form” as way of streamlining the formal data
collection process.289 The ACS, however, does not survey the same breadth of
the population included in the Census; instead, the Census is a decennial
count focused on “a basic headcount and minimal demographic data.”290
To align disability with other identity classiﬁcations listed, we could
include three questions about disability on the short-form census. First, “Do
286 See, e.g., How Disability Data Are Collected from the American Community Survey, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/topics/health/disability/guidance/data-collectionacs.html [https://perma.cc/6H2P-FZF5] (Feb. 23, 2021).
287 Id.
288 While disability questions on the Census originated in 1830, the short-form Census no longer
includes questions about disability. See American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/acs/www/about/why-we-ask-each-question/disability [https://perma.cc/CX8ZSVPT]; NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK, WHY ARE THERE NO DISABILITY-RELATED
QUESTIONS ON THE 2020 CENSUS? (2020), https://www.ndrn.org/resource/why-are-there-nodisability-related-questions-on-the-2020-census [https://perma.cc/2VPW-3NPP]; cf. Brief of Historians
and Social Scientists Margo Anderson, Andrew Beveridge, Rachel Buff, Morgan Kousser, Mae Ngai,
and Steven Ruggles as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139
S. Ct. 2551 (2019) (No. 18-966).
289 How Disability Data Are Collected, supra note 286.
290 Id.
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you identify as a person with a disability?” Second, “Do you believe your
disability is visible to others?” Third, “I believe my disability is visible to
others because. . .” Followed by answer choices: “(a) I use an assistive device
such as a wheelchair, prosthetic, cane, communication board, (b) my speech
or behavior is atypical (e.g., physical tics, hyperactivity, speech impairments),
or (c) I have been told my disability is visible, or (d) None of the above.” We
would still beneﬁt from the data collected by the ACS, however, Census data
on disability identity with the seal of the federal government has both
expressive and practical value. Data collected on disability should be
disaggregated along other demographic lines such as gender or age, city/state,
education level, employment status, family status, income, publicly funded
supports received (e.g., Medicaid or Medicare) as examples of desired
disaggregation. Importantly, deﬁnitions of disability listed should address the
ways in which people struggle with self-identiﬁcation as well as the purpose
of the data collection and why this information is important to report. This
priming may increase the number of people who claim disability identity and
allows us a centralized source for capturing intersectional identities.
What eﬀect might such changes have? Interestingly, when the Census ﬁrst
expanded the available categories for race, civil rights organizations such as
the NAACP worried about the dilution of the beneﬁts extended to particular
minority groups. Speciﬁcally, the NAACP claimed that “the creation of a
multiracial classiﬁcation might disaggregate the apparent numbers of
members of discrete minority groups, diluting beneﬁts to which they are
entitled as a protected class under civil rights laws.”291 To what extent might
people with more apparent disabilities argue the same point if people can
simply self-identify on the Census form as disabled?
Developing the institutional capacity and scaﬀolding for meaningful data
collection could include several pilot projects in public institutions that
already have systems in place to collect demographic data. One larger data
collection option is to add this question to the Social Security
Administration’s data collection, which could help us better understand how
people who receive social security disability insurance (SSDI) beneﬁts
perceive their connection to disability identity.292
291 Kenneth Prewitt, Racial Classification in America: Where Do We Go from Here?, 134 DAEDALUS
5, 10 (2005) (quoting Federal Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Info., & Tech. of the Comm on Gov’t Reform & Oversight,
105th Cong. 578-79 (1997) (statement of Harold McDougall, Dir., Washington Burau, NAACP)).
292 Doron Dorfman conducted a qualitative study to better understand the disconnect between
perceptions of disability by social security beneﬁts recipients and those narratives created by social
security laws. See Doron Dorfman, Disability Identity in Conflict: Performativity in the U.S. Social
Security Benefits System, 38 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 47 (2015). The inclusion of a disability question
in existing data collection to a broader sample of beneﬁts recipients under certain conditions could
be an example of a relatively lower cost data collection that builds on existing institutional structures.
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2. Choice Architecture and Publicity Nudges
The balance between privacy and publicity values as structural
antidiscrimination devices should vary based on several factors.293 First, and
most important in designing laws and policies with the right balance of
privacy and publicity, we need to understand which settings have the greatest
potential to shift social norms. Here, the social science literature emphasizes
two settings where a person with a less visible marginalized identity can
“come out” and impact the attitudes that underwrite discrimination:
employment and higher education.294 People choose not to disclose because
of the danger (physical, workplace or educational achievement, economic,
health) of sharing this information. Assume, for example, that research
indicates that employment is the best environment for shifting social norms
of disability. Possible institutional responses include legislative eﬀorts to
strengthen the antidiscrimination safety net so people who come out know
that if they experience bias (both explicit and implicit) as a result of coming
out, they receive litigation beneﬁts such as favorable presumptions or
reductions in applicable burdens of production or persuasion.295
At the employer level, several potential institutional responses exist.
Employers need to change workplace climates, which requires a long-term
commitment. This could include required publication of disability
antidiscrimination complaints ﬁled with the EEOC against the employer,
ﬁnal opinions, and, if settled, disclosure of the policy changes to be
implemented. The employer can commit to public settlements and reject the
use of nondisclosure provisions as part of the settlement negotiation. While
the person with a disability would have control over their name, there is no
reason why the employer cannot publish statistics in the aggregate,
particularly for larger organizations. The places of publication could be
employee breakrooms or monthly newsletters and meetings where employees
would hear about litigation. These statistics would also be made available on
the company’s website to ensure public accountability. Another beneﬁt would
be to regularly identify opportunities for structural reforms rather than
individual accommodations such as when the data shows, for example, that
30% of employees have carpal tunnel. Instead of individually assessing each
293 See RICHARDS, supra note 32 (manuscript intro. at 7-8) (advancing the idea that the design
of privacy rules can help mitigate inequities in the balance of power between those who possess
disproportionate access to both the means of data control as well as the data itself and those whose
data is the oil that runs the data-dependent machinery).
294 See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954) (listing the
conditions shown to contribute to greater norm shifts which include equal status, common goals,
intergroup cooperation, and support of authorities, law, or customs).
295 The presumptions should be more than Title VII disparate impact presumptions. See
generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
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employee (which can be costly), employers can invest in ergonomic assistive
technology that will beneﬁt those with and without carpal tunnel. While one
concern is that publicity may increase fear and reluctance to come out, over
time, the greater information in circulation can reduce overall costs of
disclosure to the individual.296
Second, we need to better understand if the impact and eﬀectiveness of
disclosure on social norms varies depending on other factors such as who is
disclosing (demographics on age, race, gender, socioeconomic status).297 For
example, if we knew that greater normative shifts occurred when wellestablished, middle-aged, white, men came out as disabled, we might design
a top-down approach to disclosure, that creates incentives for people who are
well established in their careers and who might even have a public presence
to come out. One way might be through ﬁnancial incentives, direct grants to
do this, positions of authority, or being the public face of the organization. In
this way, if the data supported it, we could develop the disability “brand” by
incentivizing people like Justice Sotomayor (who came out as a person with
diabetes), or David Boies (a nationally renowned litigator) and actor Henry
Winkler, both who came out as people with learning disabilities. Consider
how singer-songwriter-actor Lady Gaga’s coming out as a person with
ﬁbromyalgia is changing public discourse on its legitimacy as a chronic
illness.298 While placing the risks associated with disclosure on the few with
the least to lose, a danger here would be exceptionalism, treating famous
people with disabilities as exceptions and not the norm.
Third, we have a ﬁrst actor problem here. The costs of disclosure are
highest, and often are, for ﬁrst actors in any setting as they are when
attempting to nudge disclosure and develop publicity norms. Institutional
actors—employers, educators—could consider what Professor Ian Ayres and
Cait Unkovic call “information escrows,” or “mechanism[s] of conditional,
intermediated communication[s].”299 Ayres and Unkovic argue that the ﬁrst
actor problem in sexual assault and whistleblower cases can be addressed
through information banking, or “allegation escrows” that “allow people to
296 Other policy interventions include investing in the creation of an aﬃnity group and
commitment to making disability a part of the institution’s overall diversity eﬀorts.
297 I do not list all of the potentially relevant variables here; however, one might consider the
eﬀect on norm shifts of types of invisible disabilities disclosed—for example, mental health
disabilities might have less of an impact relative to learning disabilities.
298 She made it more prevalent and a part of human diﬀerence rather than incapacity. See
Laura Hensley, Lady Gaga on Her Fight with Fibromyalgia: ‘Chronic Pain Is No Joke,’ GLOB. NEWS
(Sept. 11, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://globalnews.ca/news/4438236/what-is-ﬁbromyalgia-lady-gaga
[https://perma.cc/GB7H-XJWB] (discussing Lady Gaga’s ongoing struggle with ﬁbromyalgia, a
brief history of the chronic illness, and where it stands today as a veriﬁed physical illness).
299 Ian Ayres & Cait Unkovic, Information Escrows, 111 MICH. L. REV. 145, 150 (2012)
(emphasis omitted).

2021]

Taking Disability Public

1747

place actionable claims into escrow that will only be ﬁled against a potential
defendant by the escrow agent if a prespeciﬁed number of allegations are
ledged against the same defendant.”300 The primary function of this model,
in sexual assault cases, is to respond to the possibility that there will be a ﬁrstmover disadvantage in claiming sexual assault or harassment.301 Victims are
often more reluctant to bring an initial claim because they face a higher risk
of retaliation from accused harassers, their credibility is more prone to attack,
and some potential claimants may be unsure about whether they incorrectly
labeled their experiences as sexual assaults.302 Information escrow allows
victims “to transmit claims information to a trusted intermediary, a
centralized escrow agent, who forwards the information to proper authorities
if (and only if) certain prespeciﬁed conditions are met.”303
Building on this idea to balance interests in privacy and publicity,
institutional actors could develop what I call “disability identity escrow,” with
an independent intermediary between the employer and the employee who
owes ﬁduciary duties to employees with disabilities. The employer, to
encourage disclosure, could allocate funds for the operation of a disability
aﬃnity group to engage in such activities as networking, socializing with
colleagues, or accessing professional development opportunities.304 This is
the strategic nudge. However, the employee maintains control over whether
to participate and sets conditions of disclosure with the disability identity
escrow agent. Because the intermediary is a ﬁduciary of the employee, the
identity escrow agent can work with the employee to set the trigger for
disclosure. For example, Employee A says: “You may disclose to the employer
if four other employees also participate and disclose.” The employee does not
have to reveal (but may do so voluntarily) the speciﬁc diagnosis to participate
and the employer cannot require medical documentation as a condition of
participation. Assume employees B, C, and D have already deposited their
disability identity in escrow and set the same trigger and conditions as A. The
identity escrow agent then releases the information to the employer who
allocates the funding to the aﬃnity group. In terms of remedies, if the
identity escrow agent breaches the duty of loyalty or care, an employee has
standing to bring a tort action in state court. If the employee with a disability
experiences discrimination because of their association with and membership
in the aﬃnity group, or other discrimination based on disability since the

Id. at 159.
Id. at 188-91.
Id. at 160-61.
Id. at 147.
Another possibility is to use information escrow concepts more in line with Ayres and
Unkovic by banking disability discrimination complaints or hostile work environment claims.
300
301
302
303
304
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person disclosed, current antidiscrimination remedies would apply with
potential amendments providing for litigation incentives.305
3. Disability Law Reforms
Data collection and choice architecture are front-end interventions to
encourage greater visibility for those with less apparent disabilities. But we
also need to think about back-end interventions, that is, when people do come
out, what protections are in place suﬃcient to reduce costs on the front-end
nudges discussed above?
Here, we can consider potential reforms to disability laws that advance
greater publicity of disability identity. I will oﬀer milder and more intense
interventions here. Consider the elimination of the disability deﬁnition in
the ADA as a nudge. Rather than exerting resources on the litigation of
whether someone has a legal disability, we might repeal that portion of the
ADA and have plaintiﬀs address discrimination and causation from the start.
That is, rather than have a person with a less visible disability expend time
and money to secure an expert, complete the necessary forms, engage in the
interactive process, we might decide that like race or gender, the adjudicative
focus should be the substantive discrimination claim.
If we eliminate the threshold question of whether the individual meets
the disability deﬁnition, people may fear fraud. Questions about the nature
of disability and extent of functional impairment will likely be addressed, in
the employment context, for example, when pleading and proving the failure
to provide a reasonable accommodation, improper discharge, or disparate
impact. The beneﬁt of eliminating this step is its signal to people with
disabilities that personal claims to disability deserve a certain degree of
deference to the individual disabled plaintiﬀ.
If we want to incentivize publicity, we might place a greater burden on
the individual in the ﬁrst instance to disclose disability more publicly. To do
this, we need to develop a stronger antidiscrimination safety net to help
capture potential discrimination after disclosure. We want to get to the point
where people with disabilities no longer need the privacy protections in the
ADA because our antidiscrimination eﬀorts (both front- and back-end) are
working eﬀectively. However, until then, the risks and potential costs to
individuals are great. To mitigate these risks, we should consider litigation
beneﬁts and procedural rule reforms that could help incentivize individuals
and institutional actors to promote visibility. Consider, for example, a shift
of the burden of proof, speciﬁcally the burden of persuasion: a plaintiﬀ who
comes out in the workplace and experiences an adverse employment action
305

See supra Part II.
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based on disability (or perceived as such) might show that she was public
about her otherwise less apparent disability. This would be a low burden of
persuasion where she might show that she wore a “Mad Pride” shirt
celebrating neurodiversity and psychosocial disabilities during the employee
summer outing. With this evidentiary showing, the burden might then shift
to the employer to show that the alleged adverse employment action was not
motivated by disability.
CONCLUSION
Disability law has a privacy problem. Taking disability public may appear
counterintuitive, at least initially, but, as this Article has argued, maintaining
existing privacy preferences in disability laws without interrogation and
public debate is not costless. Speciﬁc prescriptions require public debate
about the value of privacy and publicity in a given context, the stakes of
disclosure and nondisclosure, and the role of the state in advancing publicity
or privacy in those areas. In this sense, this Article opens the conversation by
challenging an untested assumption and oﬀering an analytical framework for
analysis and discussion. After three decades and with such a signiﬁcant public
information deﬁcit about the prevalence and diversity of capabilities under
the umbrella of “people with disabilities,” we cannot aﬀord to ignore this
debate any longer.

